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NOTES
INTERCEPTORS AND INNOCENT RECIPIENTS:
APPLYING THE FEDERAL WIRETAPPING LAW'S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO PRIVATE
PARTICIPANT MONITORING
Electronic surveillance has always provoked sharp debate. Those in favor of elec-
tronic surveillance praise its ability to provide law enforcement officials with the tools to
fight organized crime. Those who oppose it fear the arrival of Orwell's "Big Brother"
and the corresponding loss of personal privacy. By the mid-1960s, however, both pro-
ponents and opponents of electronic surveillance agreed on two issues: I) tremendous
technological advances had increased the Potential for the abuse of wiretapping, bugging
and other forms of electronic surveillance, and 2) the federal law regarding electronic
surveillance had become intolerable. 1 The law failed to assist law enforcement officials,
and did not adequately protect personal privacy. 2 In response to both concerns, Congress
enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title
111). 3
Title III both regulates governmental electronic surveillance and limits the condi-
tions under which private citizens may lawfully intercept wire or oral communications.- 0
In particular, section 2511(2)(d) restricts the circumstances under which private persons
may lawfully intercept wire or oral communications in which they participate, and
restricts the circumstances under which participants may consent to an interception by
a third person. 5 This type of electronic surveillance is termed "private participant mon-
itoring."
Private participant monitoring refers to three distinct electronic surveillance tech-
niques: 1) when a participant records the conversation; 2) when a participant uses an
electronic device to transmit the conversation to a third party; or 3) when a participant
I See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2112, 2154 [hereinafter SENATE ItErowd. "Wiretapping" is the monitoring of wire communications,
usually telephone communications. J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1 .1(a) (2d
ed. 1987). Wiretapping generally is accomplished by coning into the wires over which the com-
munication is carried. "Bugging" is the monitoring of a speaker's conversation. Id. § at 3-4.
A bug is a miniature electronic device that is usually located close to the person whom one seeks
to overhear. A wiretap only overhears communications on a particular telephone, whereas a bugging
device hears all conversations that are within its range. Id. § 1.1(b), at 3.
2 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2154.
3 Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp, IV 1986)) thereinafter Title 1111.
4 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2113. Title 111 applies to all governmental agents and
private citizens. Id.
5 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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consents to a third party's interception.6
 Participant monitoring is the most commonly
used eavesdropping method.? Section 2511(2)(d), which prohibits private participant
monitoring that has an unlawful purpose, is the first federal restriction of private
participant monitoring.8
Historically, electronic surveillance of any kind, private or governmental, did not
violate federal statutory or constitutional law. Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 launched the modern era 9
 of federal regulation of electronic surveillance. 19
Although section 605 restricted some forms of electronic surveillance, it was grossly
inadequate." Section 605 permitted private participant monitoring 12 and had little de-
terrent value because it lacked an express exclusionary rule. 13
 In addition to permissive
statutory law, until 1967 courts would not apply the fourth amendment to electronic
surveillance unless a government official trespassed into a constitutionally protected
area." Even if wiretapping or bugging violated the fourth amendment, such a violation
would not affect private participa'nt monitoring because such private surveillance does
not involve state action, and consequently does not trigger constitutional protections."
Until the late 1960s, therefore, federal law pertaining to electronic surveillance was
permissive. Not until 1968, when Congress passed Title III, did a comprehensive law
concerning electronic surveillance come into existence. 16
6
 See Greenawalt, The Consent PrOblem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring
with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 Cot.um. L. REV. 189, 190 n.9 (1968).
7 J. CARE, supra note 1, § 3,5, at 56.
8
 Section 2511(2)(d) states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party
to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States or of any State.
Id.
The first federal wiretapping regulation, enacted in 1917 as part of World War I's security
program, expired with the end of the war. Act of Oct. 29, 1918, ch. 197, 40 Stat. 1017. See Goldstone,
The Federal Wiretapping Law, 44 'rEX. B.J. 382, 387 (1981).
L° Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). The
pertinent pan of section 605 stated: "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such communication to any person ...." Id.; see also infra notes 45-50 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of section 605.
" J. CARR, supra note 1, § 1.3(b), at 9-16, § 1.4(b)(1).
12
 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 109 (1957).
13 Seel CARR, supra note I, § 1.3(b), at 9.
" See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
The first clause of the fourth amendment states that the "rights of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has consistently construed the
protections of the fourth amendment as proscribing only governmental action. The fourth amend-
ment is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation or knowledge of any
government official." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see also Greenawalt, supra note 6, at
189, 203 n.69.
16 See Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74
J. Cam. L. & ClumiNoLoGy 1, 3-4 (1983).
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Title III has two purposes. Title III's major purpose is to combat certain serious
crimes by allowing law enforcement personnel, under strict conditions, to intercept wire
and oral communications." Its other purpose is to protect personal privacy. Unlike
section 605, Title III contains both a provision limiting private participant monitoring
and an express exclusionary provision. 18 Consequently, Title 111 provides more protec-
tion for personal privacy than section 605 because it restricts more types of private
electronic surveillance and excludes from court proceedings evidence obtained from
unlawful electronic surveillance. Most commentators agree that Title III vastly improves
the federal law pertaining to electronic surveillance.'u
Unfortunately, courts have not applied Title III consistently. In 1987, two federal
appellate courts reached conflicting decisions regarding how Title III's exclusionary rule
should apply to violations of its restrictions on private participant monitoring. In United
Slates v. Underhill, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the
defendants' motion to suppress tape recordings of telephone conversations.2u Two of
the defendants made these recordings • to further their gambling operation; the other
defendants did not make the recordings, but participated in the gambling operation,
and their voices were on the tape recordings. The court held that those who intercept
wire communications, and their co-conspirators, waive any privacy right that Title III
was intended to protect." In contrast, in United States v. Vest, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit granted the defendant's motion to suppress tape recordings of oral
communications between the defendant and hiS co-conspirator, which his co-conspirator
made to further their conspiracy. 22 The court held that co-conspirators who do not
consent to an interception possess a legitimate privacy right in conversations that were
intercepted to further a conspiracy." These decisions demonstrate that courts treat cases
involving private participant monitoring inconsistently.
This note analyzes the federal law concerning private participant monitoring. It also
considers under what circumstances courts should suppress evidence obtained from
unlawful private participant monitoring. Section I examines the origins of section
2511(2)(d), the Title III provision governing private participant monitoring, and section
2515, the statutory exclusionary provision." The section recounts briefly the history of
the federal law concerning electronic surveillance and provides the legislative history of
sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515. Section II traces the judicial interpretation of sections
2511(2)(d) and 2515.25 Section III describes two 1987 decisions involving the attempted
suppression of evidence derived from unlawful private participant monitoring." These
two decisions reach conflicting results concerning the appropriate interrelationship of
sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515. Section IV suggests a two step framework for courts to
t7
	 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2153, 2157; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2519 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
1 " 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 I(2)(d), 2515 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
" See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 5.
2° United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2989, 3268
(1087), 108 S. Ct. 81, 141 (1988).
2L Id. at 112.
22 United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1987).
" See Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
" See infra notes 29-135 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 136-84 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 185-277 and accompanying text.
904	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 29:901
use in cases involving evidence obtained in violation of section 2511(2)(d). 27 Under this
framework, courts should first examine the intercepted conversation to ensure that it
meets the statutory definition of a "wire" or "oral communication." If the conversation
meets the initial requirement, courts should next examine the relationship among the
party moving to suppress, the proponent of the evidence and the intercepted commu-
nication. If the party seeking to suppress is also the unlawful interceptor, a court should
deny the motion. Allowing interceptors to suppress evidence derived from their own
illegal monitoring would enable them to use Title III to shield themselves from the
consequences of their unlawful acts.'When the proponent of the evidence is the unlawful
interceptor, however, and the party moving to suppress is the victim of the interception,
a court should grant the motion. Suppressing the evidence would deter the interceptor
and protect the personal privacy of the nonconsenting party. When neither the person
seeking suppression nor •the proponent of the evidence is the unlawful interceptor, a
court should suppress only if disclosure at trial would harm a material privacy right of
the party seeking suppression. Suppression under these circumstances would not deter
the unlawful interceptor because am innocent recipient is attempting to use the evidence.
Thus, because suppression would only promote one of the purposes of Title III, persons
seeking suppression should demonstrate a material privacy interest — one distinct from
and in addition to the right to control public disclosure of personal information. This
framework strikes the appropriate balance between the conflicting purposes of Title III:
securing evidence to investigate and prosecute criminals, and protecting material privacy
rights. Section IV concludes by applying the framework to two 1987 decisions, United
Slates v. Underhill and United States v. Vest. 25
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL LAW CONCERNING PRIVATE PARTICIPANT MONITORING
Two pieces of federal legislation have had a great impact on electronic surveillance:
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, and Title 111. 29 Legislation that
regulates electronic surveillance represents a compromise between conflicting goals:
reducing crime by providing the police with the tools to investigate and prosecute
criminals, and protecting privacy by imposing criminal and civil penalties for the un-
authorized use of electronic surveillance." Judicial interpretation of both statutes illus-
trates the tension between these competing interests. 3 '
A. Historical Background of Title III
Wiretapping and bugging devices have been used for political, industrial and military
purposes since the mid-nineteenth century. 32 Not until 1928, in Olmstead v. United Slates,
however, did the United States Supreme Court consider the constitutionality of wiretap-
27 See infra notes 278-358 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 359-86 and accompanying text.
29 Seel CARR, supra note 1, § Li, § 1.3, at 8-16.
See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 3-4.
5 ' See, e.g., United Slates v. Donoan, 429 U.S. 413, 432-39 (1977) (interpreting Title III);
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-29 (1974) (interpreting Title Ill); Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107, 108-11 (1957) (interpreting section 605); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 380-85 (1937) (interpreting section 605).
92 Relatively sophisticated communications systems had developed by the mid-19th century.
Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 7. Electronic surveillance was used for gathering intelligence during
the Civil War, as well as for industrial and political espionage. Id.
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ping." The Olmstead Court held that, absent a physical intrusion into a person's home,
wiretapping did not violate the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution."
In Olmstead, the police placed wiretaps on the defendants' home and office telephone
lines at points outside the defendants' premises." The Court admitted evidence from
these wiretaps over the defendants' objections that the wiretaps violated their fourth
amendment rights." The Court held that, because the federal agents had not intruded
onto the defendants' premises, no search or seizure had occurred for fourth amendment
purposes."
The Olmstead holding that a fourth amendment search or seizure does not occur
absent a government trespass into a constitutionally protected area — stood for forty
years." Although Olmstead involved wiretapping, throughout the next forty years the
Supreme Court applied the Olmstead rationale to cases involving bugging devices and
wired informants. 39 For example, the Supreme Court held that police officers who taped
a conversation between themselves and a defendant, or transmitted a conversation to
another officer, did not violate the fourth amendment.° The Court reasoned that,
because the defendant consented to speak with the person who secretly taped their
conversation, the defendant assumed the risk that the person to whom he or she spoke
was a federal agent who would either repeat their conversation to the police, or would
record the conversation and bring the tape to the police."
In addition to placing only limited restrictions on governmental surveillance, the
Olmstead decision did not protect persons from private electronic surveillance. The
Olmstead holding addressed only fourth amendment violations. Because the fourth
amendment does not apply to private electronic surveillance, the Olmstead decision did
not render evidence derived from a private wiretap inadmissible at criminal trials.42
Therefore, even if a private party trespassed onto another's property to conduct a
wiretap, and the police inadvertently obtained the wiretap evidence, it would be admis-
sible in a criminal trial of the wiretap's victim.°
The Olmstead Court suggested that Congress enact legislation if it wished to outlaw
wiretapping." Six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted section 605 of the Federal
" 277 U.S. 438,464-67 (1928).
34 Id. at 466.
" Id. a t .456-57.
56 Id. at 466-69.
n Id. at 464,466.
" The Supreme Court finally repudiated the Olmstead trespass doctrine in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347,353 (1967). See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Katz.
59 See, e.g., I..opez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,438-39 (1963) (applied to wired informant);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,510,512 (1961) (applied to bugging devices); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747,753-54 (1952) (applied to wired informant); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129,135-36 (1942) (applied to bugging devices).
40 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438-39; On Lee, 343. U.S. at 753-54.
41 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438-39.
42 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,473-75 (1921) (fourth amendment is inapplicable
when a former employee took papers incriminating a discharged employee from the office safe
and turned the papers over to the United States Justice Department); see also supra note 15.
45 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 203 & n.69.
44 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66 ("Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone
messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart front the common law of evidence.").
Although Congress considered an array of legislation that would have overruled Olmstead, none
was enacted. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 11. Congress's authority to legislate in this area, however,
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Communications Act of 1934." Congress enacted section 605 to define the jurisdiction
of the newly-established Federal Communication Commission." Although neither the
statute's language nor its legislative history indicates that Congress was addressing wir-
etapping, 47
 the Supreme Court later interpreted section 605 to preclude the admission
of nonconsensual wiretap evidence in federal court."
Evidence obtained in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in federal court:"
Nevertheless, several weaknesses in section 605 prevented it from significantly reducing
unlawful electronic surveillance. For instance, section 605 did not prohibit participant
monitoring." In addition, because , section 605 applied only to communications trans-
mitted over communication systems, it did not prohibit bugging devices or wired infor-
mants. 5 t United States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach commented that section
605 was the "worst of all possible solutions." 52
 Law enforcement personnel could not use
electronic surveillance effectively to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. Moreover,
both public officials and private citizens could ignore section 605's sanctions and invade
personal privacy with little fear of prosecution."
Realizing that section 605 was inadequate both as a tool for fighting crime and as a
deterrent to invasions of privacy, Congress considered many amendments to section
605, 54
 Most attempts at reform failed because of a conflict between those who favored
is not all encompassing. See United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 853-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 871 (1979); see also Comment, Federal Nexus in Electronic Surveillance, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 568, 568-77 (1980).
45
 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982). The
pertinent part of section 605 stated that no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such communication to any person ...." Id.
46 Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 11.
" Id.; see also S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
48
 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379,'382-85 (1937). Notwithstanding the lack of an
exclusionary provision in section 605, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language that
"no person shall divulge" to prohibit even reciting the contents in testimony. Id. at 382 (direct
evidence); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 388, 341 (1939) (evidence indirectly obtained, the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine).
The first Nardone decision was widely criticized as judicial legislation. Its sweep was potentially
much broader than the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. For example, it applied in both
federal and state courts. It also applied even if a private party not acting under color of law had
effected the wiretapping. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at l2.
49 Nardone, 302 U.S. at 382-85.
5°
 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 1 I 1 (1957). In Rathbun, the Court held that an
"interception" did not occur when one party to a telephone conversation allowed another to listen
in. The Court stated that lelach party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other
party may allow another [to] ... hear the conversation." Id.
5 ' J. CARR, supra note 1, § 1.4(b)(1); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942).
" J. CARR, supra note I, § 2.1, at 2. Section 605's other inadequacies include a requirement that
the government prove both an interception and a disclosure in order to obtain a conviction. Id.
1.3(b)(5), at 16. The Justice Department defended its wiretapping by asserting that if one agent
wiretapped and another disclosed, then neither violated section 605. Id. In addition, section 605
lacked a civil remedy or damage provision. Id. § I.3(b)(4). But see Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162
F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (proof that the defendant had both intercepted and divulged the
communication was held to provide the basis for a civil damage claim).
" J. CARR, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 2.
54
 Id. § 2.2, at 4-5. This legislation uniformly attempted to add a national security exception to
section 605. Id.
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limited official eavesdropping and those who sought an absolute ban. 55 The Eighty-Ninth
and Ninetieth Congresses forged a compromise between these two conflicting groups. 56
Two bills introduced in the first session of the Ninetieth Congress ultimately combined
to become Title 111. 57
In addition to these bills, 1967 Supreme Court decisions also affected Title II l's
final language." In Katz v. United States, the Court overturned the Olmstead trespass
doctrine and held that the fourth amendment protects reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy.5'' In Katz, the police had attached a bug to the outside of a telephone booth 6 0
Although it found no trespass into a constitutionally protected area, the Court held that
the action constituted a search and seizure." 1 In ruling that the search and seizure violated
the fourth amendment, the Court emphasized that the fourth amendment "protects
people, not places."62 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion sets forth the standard 63 that
is now generally accepted as the Katz rule of law.° Pursuant to this standard, most courts
now hold that a fourth amendment violation occurs where the police violate a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 65 Congress drafted Title III to conform with the
principles of Katz. 66
Both proponents and opponents of electronic surveillance agreed that the pre-Title
III federal law regarding electronic surveillance — the constitutional law arising from
Olmstead and its progeny, and section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
5' Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 190; see also Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 33 n.183.
56 Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 3.
67 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2153; J. CARR, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 5-6. Senator John
McClellan introduced the Federal Interception Act. J. CARR, supra note I, § 2.3, at 5-6. This Act
contained many elements crucial to Title III, but lacked the procedural requirements soon required
by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967). Id. Senator Roman Hruska introduced the
Electronic Surveillance Act. Id. Although similar to the McClellan bill, Hruska drafted his bill to
contain the restrictions of Berger. Id. Professor G. Robert Blakey of Notre Dame Law School, a
former Justice Department attorney, was the primary draftsman of Title III, a combination of the
McClellan and Hruska bills, In drafting Title 111, Blakey also relied on his own conceptions of what
should comprise a model electronic surveillance statute. See Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic
Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 657 (1968).
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2153 Mile III drafted to comply with Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). The Supreme Court
decided Berger on June 12, 1967, and Katz on December 18, 1967.
In Berger, the Supreme Court declared the New York wiretapping statute unconstitutional on
its face. 388 U.S. at 64. The Court established eight criteria that law enforcement officials must
follow to obtain authorization for a wiretap. Id. at 50-64; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at
2161-62 (listing the eight criteria); Comment, Does the "One-Party Consent" Exception Effectuate the
Underlying Goals of Title III?, 18 AKRON L. REv. 495, 498-500 (1985). The Berger decision provided
Congress with a framework for designing Title III. SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2163.
m Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). For a discussion of Olmstead, see supra notes 33-39 and
accompanying text.
" Katz, 389 U.S, at 348.
I Id. at 353.
" Id.
65 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Tilliere is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
6' note 16, at 29 n.160.
65 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 383-87 (1974).
61 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2153.
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— was inadequate.° The law neither assisted law enforcement agents in their attempts
to limit serious crime nor protected personal privacy." Thus, although federal restriction
of electronic surveillance gradually increased during the forty years following Olmstead,
Title III represents the first comprehensive federal legislation in this area.
B. Title III
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 became law
on June 19, 1968.69
 Congress enacted Title III for two purposes. Title III's major
purpose is to combat organized crime by allowing law enforcement personnel, under
strict conditions, to intercept wire and oral communications." Its other purpose is to
protect personal privacy. 71
Title III contains several provisions designed to protect personal privacy. Title III
imposes strict procedural requirements for law enforcement officials who wish to use
electronic surveillance." In addition, Title III imposes criminal penalties on persons
who violate its provisions," and provides civil remedies to any person who is a party to
a communication that is intercepted, used or disclosed in violation of Title 111. 74 Title
III also contains an express exclusionary provision that prevents an unlawful interceptor
from using the fruits of his or her unlawful actions." For the purposes of this note, the
most important provision designed to protect privacy is section 2511(2)(d), which restricts
private participant monitoring."
The provisions that protect personal privacy make Title III significantly more re-
strictive than the legislation it replaced." Although persons were criminally prosecuted
for violating section 605, section 605 did not contain an express exclusionary rule nor
did it provide a civil cause of action. 79
 In addition to containing specific protections that
section 605 lacked, Title III has a much wider scope. Title III applies to all electronic
surveillance, whereas section 605 applied only to communications transmitted over a
communication system.79
67 Id. at 2154,
68 Id.
69
 Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
At the time it enacted Title III, Congress amended section 605 so that it applied only to radio
communications, Act.of June 19, 1968, § 803.
7° SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2153, 2157.
Id. at 2153.
72
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2519 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Among other procedural requirenients of
Tide Ill, the principal state or federal prosecutor must apply to a local judge of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception. Id. § 2516. The judge must find probable
cause that one of the crimes enumerated in section 2516 has been, or is about to be committed,
and that relevant communications will be intercepted. Id. § 2518(3). The judge must also find that
normal investigatk,e procedures will likely fail or be too dangerous. Id. Also, a judge who has issued
an order may require the officers conducting the surveillance to periodically report to the judge
regarding the success of their surveillance. Id. § 2518(6). See generally I CARR, supra note 1, § 4.
73
 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
74 Id. § 2520.
76 Id. § 2515; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2156.
76
 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
77
 See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 32-40.
78 J. CARR, supra note I, §§ 1.3(b)(I), (b)(4).




I. Section 2511(2)(d) — Restricting Private Participant Monitoring
Section 2511(2)(d) prohibits a private participant from monitoring wire and oral
communications for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act." Section
2511(2)(d) complements section 2511(2)(c), which authorizes warrantless participant
monitoring by persons acting under color of law. 8 ' Together, these two sections comprise
Title II1's restrictions on participant monitoring.
As originally drafted, Title 111 did not limit private participant monitoring." The
original version of section 25I1(2)(c) made all participant monitoring lawful, whether
private or governmental. Thus, so long as one of the parties consented to the intercep-
tion, the monitoring was lawful." By allowing participant monitoring, Congress codified
existing Supreme Court case law, which held that participant monitoring violated neither
the fourth amendment nor section 605. 8 '
scope than section 605, Title III legitimized the law of electronic surveillance by specifically ad-
dressing and systematizing many of the problems posed by electronic surveillance. See Goldsmith,
supra note 16, at 3-6. Moreover, prior distinctions between wiretapping and other forms of eaves-
dropping such as bugging were now legally irrelevant because Title Ill applied equally to all
methods of electronic surveillance, as long as someone had "intercepted" a communication. See
infra note 90 for the definition of "intercept."
Title III also affected state electronic surveillance law. States must enact their own legislation
if they wish to utilize the authority granted by section 2516(2) to conduct electronic surveillance. J.
CARE, supra note 1 , § 2.4(b). Moreover, the Senate Report made clear that state statutes must "meet
the.minimum standards reflected as a whole" in 'Title III. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2187.
Generally, however, federal courts admit evidence obtained in violation of a more restrictive state
electronic surveillance statute as long as the evidence was obtained in compliance with Title Ill.
United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (197(i). See generally
Note, United States v. McNulty: Title III and the Admissibility in Federal Court of Illegally Gathered State
Evidence, 80 Nw, U.L. REV. 1714 (1986).
80 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d), provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law
to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication where such person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
Id.
81 1d. § 2511(2)(c). Section 2511(2)(c) provides: "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for
a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person
is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception." Id.
Although Title III sanctions almost all forms of participant monitoring, many states limit both
private and governmental participant monitoring. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. (h. 272, § 99
(West 1984). In Commonwealth v. Blood, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that section
99(B)(4), which permitted participant monitoring in certain circumstances, violated the Massachu-
setts Constitution. 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987); see also Abratnovsky, Surreptitious Recording
of Witnesses in Criminal Cases: A Quest for Truth or a Violation of Law and Ethics?, 57 Tut,. L. REV. 1,
10-12 (1982).
" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2182, 2236. Originally, section 2511(2)(c) provided: "It
shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a party to any wire or oral communication, or a person
given prior authority by a party to this communication to intercept such communication." Meredith
v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 797-98 n.4 (8th Cir. 1971).
88 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2182.
84 Id. The Senate Report cited the following three cases as illustrations of the then-existing case
910	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 29:901
Several Senators were dissatisfied with Title III in its original form. They believed
that Title III should prohibit all participant monitoring that had an unlawful purpose."
Therefore, when the bill reached the Senate floor for debate, Senators Hart and Mc-
Clellan proposed, and Congress approved, that the exception for participant monitoring,
section 251I(2)(c), be split into two subsections, (c) and (d). 88
 Revised section 2511(2)(c)
applied only to participant monitoring by persons acting under color of law. 87
 Revised
section 2511(2)(d) prohibited a private participant from monitoring for the purpose of
committing a criminal, tortious or other injurious act."
Although Senator Hart specified the general purposes of newly-created section
2511(2)(d) when he introduced it on the Senate floor, the precise scope of the section is
unclear.89
 Section 2511(2)(d) comprised numerous phrases that Title III defined in other
sections. 9° For example, by its limiting definition of "oral communication," Title 111
protects only those oral communications uttered by persons having a reasonable expec-
tation that their conversation "is not subject to interception."" Title III does not, how-
ever, define or explain what circumstances would justify a participant's expectation that
law regarding participant monitoring. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (a
federal agent who tape records a conversation between himself and the defendant, who did not
know about the taping, did not violate the fourth amendment); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S.
107, 108-11 (1957) (evidence obtained by a police officer who listened on an extension telephone
to a conversation between the defendant and the consenting party did not violate section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952)
(an informant who transmits an incriminating conversation between himself and the defendant to
the police did not violate the fourth amendment).
85 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2222-38.
88 114 Cotic. REC. 14,694 (1968).
	 '
87
 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). For the text of section 25I1(2)(c), see supra note 81.
88
 18 U.S.C. § 251 I(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For the text of section 2511(2)(d), see supra
note 80. In 1986, Congress amended section 251 l(2)(d) to omit from its prohibition the phrase "or
for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(b)(2), 100 Stat. 1848, 1850.
89 For Senator Hart's comments regarding section 2511(2)(d), see infra note 100.
9° Section 2510(4) defines "intercept": "[Iintercept means the aural acquisition of the contents
of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Section 2510(1) defines "wire communication":
[W]ire communication means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through
the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable,
or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by
any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign
commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication, but
such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit.
Id. § 2510(1).
9' Section 2510(2) defines "oral communication": "oral communication means any oral com-
munication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject
to interception under circumstances justifying such an expectation, but such term does not include
any electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text
for a discussion of how courts have interpreted the scope of "oral communication."
The definition of wire communication does not explicitly require such an expectation of privacy.
Congress evidently assumed that all telephone conversations deserve protection from interception.
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his or her conversation was not subject to interception by another party to the commu-
nication.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report, Title 111's official legislative history, dis-
cusses what circumstances would constitute such an expectation. 92 The Report suggests
that certain factors — the person's subjective intent and the place where the communi-
cation is uttered — are significant in determining a justifiable expectation." The Report
does not, however, specify any other factors. Instead, the Report states that the person's
expectation is to be "gathered and evaluated from and in terms of all the facts and
circu instances."94
The Report also states that the definition of an oral communication should reflect
existing law and cites Katz v. United States as an illustration." As the Supreme Court has
applied Katz to participant monitoring, however, a person does not have a reasonable
expectation that another party to the conversation will not record it." Thus, strict
application of Katz would exclude all private participant monitoring from the statutory
definition of an oral communication." Consequently, the Senate Report, although it
suggests some of the relevant factors, does not provide a clear answer to the question of
which circumstances justify a speaker's expectation that his or her words will not be
intercepted."
The specific legislative history of section 2511(2)(d), like that of Title 111 as a whole,
also sheds little light on precisely what circumstances constitute a justifiable expectation. 99
92 The legislative history of section 2510(2) — the Senate Report — states:
The definition is intended to reflect existing law. See Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct.
507 (1967) .... The person's subjective intent or the place where the communication
is uttered is not necessarily the controlling factor. Nevertheless, such an expectation
woukl clearly be unjustified in certain areas; for example, a jail cell or an open field.
Ordinarily, however, a person would be justified in relying on such expectation when
he was in his home or office, but even there, his expectation under certain circum-
stances could be unwarranted, for example, when he speaks too loudly. The person's
expectation that his communication is or is not subject to interception ... is thus to
be gathered and evaluated from and in terms of all the facts and circumstances.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178 (citations omitted); see also Blakey & Hancock, supra note 57,
at 661-62.
9" See id.
" See id. (emphasis added).
95 Id.
9" United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971). Many commentators have criticized White.
E.g., Donovan, Informers Revisited: Government Surveillance of Domestic Political Organizations and the
Fourth and First Amendments, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 333, 367-79 (1984); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations
of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HAay. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 n.57
(1981); Case Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. REV. 831 (1972).
In addition, in 1987 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to adopt the White rationale,
and held that one provision of the Massachusetts wiretap statute violated the Massachusetts Con-
stitution. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987).
9' See White, 401 U.S. at 751.
98 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178. The Senate Report fails to provide a clear answer
to the question of how the definition of an oral communication should apply to private participant
monitoring cases in large part because Congress wrote and published the Senate Report before
Title III was amended to contain section 2511(2)(d). The Report is dated April 29, 1968, and
Congress amended Title III to include section 2511(2)(d) on May 23, 1968. At the time the Report
was published, Title 111 made all participant monitoring lawful.
" See 114 CONC. REC. 14,694 (1968); SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2236-37.
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The only "official" legislative history of section 2511(2)(d) is Senator Hart's speech on
the Senate floor immediately before the Senate amended Title III to include section
2511(2)(d). 100
 Senator Hart stated that, in order to prevent abuses of the right of privacy,
Title III should permit monitoring by a private person only when that person monitors
for a defensive reason, such as keeping an accurate record of a conversation. 101 Another
defensive purpose Senator Hart approved was private participant monitoring of criminal
activity for the purpose of taking evidence to the police. According to Senator Hart,
however, Title III should prohibit private participant monitoring when the party inter-
cepting the communication has an unlawful motive. In particular, Senator Hart stated
that Title III should prohibit monitoring when the purpose of the interception is harm-
ing the other party to the conversation. 102
Senator Hart also stated that section 251 1(2)(d) would protect against "abuses of the
right of privacy." 101 Neither Title III nor Senator Hart, however, defines or explains
what "right to privacy" means. Moreover, the fourth amendment "right to privacy"
established by Katz does not prohibit participant monitoring.l°4 It is unclear, therefore,
precisely which "privacy rights" the definition of "oral communication" incorporates.
Senator Hart's statements also create uncertainty regarding which unlawful purposes
section 2511(2)(d) should reach. 1 °1 The statutory language, which, at that time, prohib-
ited intercepting for the purpose of committing any criminal, tortious or injurious act,
m 114 CONC. REC. 14,694-95 (1968). In introducing the amendment containing section
251 l(2)(d), Senator Hart stated:
The bill as we reported it out of committee leaves a gaping hole, which would
permit surreptitious monitoring of a conversation by one of the parties to the conver-
sation without the consent of the other. It leaves wide open the problem of industrial
espionage and many other abuses of the right to privacy.
In the substitute that is now pending we propose to prohibit a one-party consent
tap, except for law enforcement officials, and for private persons who act in a defensive
fashion. In other words, whenever a private person acts in such situations with an
unlawful motive, he will violate the criminal provisions of Title III and will also be
subject to a civil suit. Such one-party consent is also prohibited when the party acts in
any way with an intent to injure the other party to the conversation in any other way.
For example the secret conversation recording may be made for the purpose of
blackmailing the other party, threatening him, or publicly embarrassing him. The
provision would not, however, prohibit such activity when the party records infor-
mation of criminal activity by the other party with the purpose of taking such infor-
mation to the police as evidence. Nor does it prohibit such recording in other situations
when the party acts out of a legitimate desire to protect himself and his own conver-
sations from later distortions or other unlawful or injurious uses by the other party.
Id.
The Senate Report accompanying Title III foreshadowed the arrival of section 2511(2)(d).
Senator Hart's statements in the Report were substantially the same as his introduction of the
amendment containing section 2511(2)(d). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2236-37. The
following passage encapsulates Senator Hart's dissent in the Report: "[Title Ill] is totally permissive
with respect to surreptitious monitoring of a conversation by a party to the conversation, even
though the monitoring may be for insidious purposes such as blackmail, stealing business secrets,
or other criminal or tortious acts in violation of Federal or State laws." Id. at 2236.
101 114 CONC. REC. 14,694-95 (1968).
102 Id .
102 ird,	 •
' 14 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
'"' See 114 CONG. REC. 14,694-95 (1968). For the text of these statements, see supra note 100.
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encompassed all unlawful purposes. 10" Senator Hart's statements, however, focus on
those purposes that harm other participants to the conversation. Senator Hart did not
mention interceptions that harm someone other than a party to the intercepted conver-
sation.'" Nor did Senator Hart mention interceptions that have an unlawful purpose,
but do not have a victim, such as interceptions to further a conspiracy.'" Congress
eliminated some of the uncertainty inherent in section 2511(2)(d) in 1986.
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the
Act.).'" The Act amended several provisions in Title III. One section of the Act deleted
from section 2511(2)(d) the phrase "or for the purpose of committing any other injurious
act.""° According to the Senate Report accompanying the Act, Congress deleted the
phrase because it believed that several courts had misconstrued the phrase "other inju-
rious act.""' Congress expressed particular concern about the chilling effect on first
amendment rights caused by persons seeking money damages from journalists who
taped conversations without the speakers' consent. The Report concluded that Title III
would still forbid intercepting for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort, and
would thus offer the public sufficient protection from improper electronic surveillance." 2
The Report does not, however, explain which unlawful purposes section 251I(2)(d)
should reach.
Thus, an examination of all the relevant legislative history — the description of oral
communication in the Senate Report accompanying Title 111, Senator Hart's statements
concerning section 2511(2)(d), and the Senate Report accompanying the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act—does not clarify the precise scope and purposes of section
2511(2)(d). 1 ° Congress intended section 25I1(2)(d) to protect personal privacy by pro-
hibiting private participant monitoring motivated by an unlawful purpose. 114 Congress
also intended its prohibition to apply only to those oral communications uttered under
circumstances warranting the protection of privacy." 5 The precise contours of those
purposes and circumstances, however, are uncertain.""
'')6 See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
1°7 See 114 CONG. REC. 14,694-95 (1968).
toe Id. it is difficult to see how intercepting another's conversation for the purpose of harming
a third party invades a nonconsenting party's "right to privacy" any inure than does intercepting
for a lawful purpose. See People v. Hopkins, 93 Misc. 2d 501, 504-07, 402 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916-17
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (nonconsenting party has no standing to suppress tapes made in violation of section
2511(2)(d) where the purpose of the interception was to harm a person other than the noncon-
senting party). Although Congress may wish to prohibit all interceptions with an unlawful purpose,
and provide For the prosecution of all who intercept with an unlawful purpose, it may be unwar-
ranted to grant civil causes of action or motions to suppress to a nonconsenting party unless the
interceptions were done for the purpose of harming the nonconsenting party.
I" The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99.508, 100 Stat. 1848.
Essentially, the Act modernized Title 111 so as to include within its scope such technological advances
as electronic mail, cellular telephones, and data transmission.
Id. § 10 I (b)(2), 100 Stat. 1848, 1850.
111 S. REP. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3555, 3571-72 [hereinafter 1986 SENATE REpotrrl.
/1.2 Id.
i" See SENATE REPORT, supra note I at 2178; 114 CONC.. REC. 14,694-95 (1968); 1986 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 1H.
14 See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d).
115 See id. § 2510(2).
119 A further problem may exist with section 251 1(2)(d). As the legislative history and several
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2. Section 2515 — The Suppression Provision
Title III's intricate statutory framework prescribes the conditions under which per-
sons may use or disclose evidence derived from intercepted communications,"" who may
move for suppression," 8 and on what grounds. 19 Section 2515 establishes a precondition
to the admissibility of electronic surveillance evidence: evidence may not be admitted
unless expressly authorized by other provisions of Title 111. 120 The provisions that
cases have made clear, Congress's power to regulate purely intrastate conversations that have no
apparent effect on interstate commerce is severely in doubt. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at
2180; United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 853-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979);
United States v. Burroughs, 564 F.2d 1111, 1113-16 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Comment, supra note
44, at 568-77. Duncan and Burroughs held that a federal nexus is an essential element of crimes
charged under 2511(a). Duncan, 598 F.2d at 853-56; Burroughs, 564 F.2d at 1113-16. One court
held that, because the right to privacy as set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) is a right that the Constitution protects, and because the fourth amendment protects against
all unreasonable searches, not just governmental ones, there is a constitutional basis for prosecuting
a private person under section 2511(1)(a). United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922, 926-27 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
Finally, although the legislative history pertaining to section 2511(2)(d) may be sparse, the
Committee Report accompanying the rest of Tide III is extremely detailed concerning what Con-
gress intended for each provision and subsection of the Act. The preface to this section of the
Senate Report states: "Because of the complexity in the area of wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance, the Committee believes that a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Title III would be
appropriate in order to make explicit congressional intent in this area." SENATE REPORT, supra note
1, at 2177.
' 17 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
118 /d. § 2510(11), Section 2510(11) defines the class of aggrieved persons who have standing
to object to the admission of intercepted communications. Section 2510(11) states that: "'aggrieved
person' means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person
against whom the interception was directed." Id. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2179-80; see
also Blakey & Hancock, supra note 57, at 664; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.9
(1969).
Courts have generally disallowed motions to suppress brought by "aggrieved persons" unless
they were also participants at the trial where the unlawfully obtained evidence was to be admitted.
J. CARR, supra note 1, § 6.2(c)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1226-29 (7th
Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Title II1's standing rules, see Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 56-63,
120-25.
" 9 18	 § 2518(10)(a). Section 2518(10)(a) enumerates the grounds on which a person
with standing' may move for suppression. It states:
Any aggrieved person ... may move to suppress . on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization
or approval.
Id.; see also United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 (1977).
Section 25I8(10)(a), therefore, provides the remedy for the right that section 2515 creates, for
aggrieved persons as defined by section 2510(11). See SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2195.
iso 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received
in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other au-
thority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if disclosure of
that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Id.; see also J. CARR, supra note 1, § 6.2(e), at 68-69.
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authorize admission generally require that the communication have been intercepted
lawfully and that persons testifying concerning the Contents of the communication have
learned of the contents lawfully.'"
Section 2515's language is all-encompassing and unequivocal. 122 Section 2515 applies
to both state and federal proceedings,'" whether governmental, judicial, or administra-
tive.'" Furthermore, the suppression rule is not limited to criminal proceedings and
police actions, but applies also to civil matters and to the actions of private citizens.'"
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the official legislative history of Title
III, specifies section 2515's purposes. 126
The Senate Report reveals two primary purposes.'" First, by not allowing the illegal
interceptors to use the fruits of their acts, section 2515, like the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, is designed to deter unlawful interceptions.'" Second, unlike the
judicially-fashioned exclusionary rule, this statutory provision is designed to protect the
12 ' 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2), (3). The precise meaning of section 2515's prohibitory language is
unclear. The phrase "if disclosure would be in violation of this chapter" probably does not refer to
the criminal violations contained in section 2511. Instead, the phrase refers to sections 2517(2) and
(3), Title ill's provisions authorizing the use and disclosure of the contents of intercepted coin-
munications. See United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 324 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 937
(1979) (although section 2515's meaning is unclear with respect to evidence derived from section
2511(2)(c) interceptions, such evidence should be admitted because section 2515 is intended to
exclude only evidence that was intercepted unlawfully).
Also, section 2511(1)(c) does not impose criminal liability for disclosing information obtained
from unlawful electronic surveillance unless the disclosure is intentional and the discloser knows
that he or she obtained the information in violation of section 2511(1). See United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 529 n.18 (1974). Therefore, a court will more likely suppress evidence under Title
III titan find a criminal violation of Title III. See id.
122 But see infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text for exceptions to section 2515.
I22 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2195.
'24 Id.; see also Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 40.
' 25 Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 40 n.232. Although Title III applies to the actions of private
parties, it is not clear whether Congress intended Title 111 to supplant the traditional innocent
recipient exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. Under this exception, when a
private person unlawfully obtains evidence, and gives the evidence to the police, the government
may use it at the criminal trial of the person from whom the evidence was wrongfully obtained.
See infra note 330 for a discussion of whether Title III's legislative history indicates that Title III
should recognize the innocent recipient exception.
126 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2184-85.
121 Id. The Senate Report stated that:
Section 2515	 imposes an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with the other
prohibitions of this chapter .... It largely reflects existing law. It applies to suppress
evidence directly (Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)) or indirectly obtained
in violation of this chapter. (Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) There is,
however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). Nor generally to press the scope of the suppression role [Mei
beyond present search and seizure law. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
.... Such a suppression rule is necessary to protect privacy. The provision thus forms
an integral part of the system of limitations designed to protect privacy .. . it should
serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the
unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Blakey & Hancock, supra note 57, at 678. The Senate Report
also stated that "Mlle perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and
criminal proceedings." SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2156.
'" Id. at 2184-85; see also Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 40; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
906 (1984) (deterrence is the purpose of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
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privacy of innocent persons.' 79 When an unlawful interception violates someone's privacy
rights, Title III's suppression provision prevents a further privacy violation by prohib-
iting disclosure of the tape's contents at trial.'"
Although section 2515's language is unequivocal, the Senate Report reveals that
Congress intended the section to recognize a number of exceptions." The Report states
that section 2515 was not meant to extend beyond 1968 search and seizure law and cites
Walder v. United States." Walder established a limited exception to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule by permitting the prosecution to use evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment for impeachment purposes." The Senate Report also indicates
that section 2515 should recognize the "attenuation of the taint" rule." Pursuant to this
exception, courts admit evidence when police have acted unlawfully, but have obtained
the evidence not by exploiting that illegality, but by sufficiently distinguishable means so
as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful act.'" Thus, Congress intended that section 2515
recognize the traditional common law exceptions to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule.
In sum, section 2515 establishes a precondition to the admissibility in federal court
of evidence derived from electronic surveillance. The statutory language is absolute —
admission is permissible only when Title III authorizes it. The Senate Report, however,
reveals that Congress intended that the section recognize a number of exceptions.
11. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 2511(2)(n) AND 2515
Judicial interpretation of section 2511(2)(d), Title III's private participant monitor-
ing provision, has not followed any set pattern. Instead, courts have determined on a
case-by-case approach whether a person has intercepted a wire or oral communication
for the purpose of committing a criminal, tortious or other injurious act.' 36 In addition,
the Supreme Court has never decided a case in which the scope of section 2511(2)(d)
was at issue. Consequently, tracking the judicial development of the statute's scope
requires examining the decisions in the various federal district and appellate courts. 137
129 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2185. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974) (using the fruits of a past unlawful search "work[s] no new fourth amendment wrong").
"° See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1972). In Gelbard, the Court notes a third
purpose of section 2515: protecting the integrity of courts and administrative proceedings. In other
words, the Gelbard Court stated that Congress passed 2515 to "ensure that the courts do not become
partners to illegal conduct." Id. at 51.
131 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2184-85.
in Id. at 2185.
133 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
134 SENATE REPORT, Supra note I, at 2185.
' 35
 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
136 See, e.g., Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971).
'" See. e.g., United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2484, 3268 (1987), 108 S. Ct. 81, 141 (1988); United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Mass.
1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1131-32 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959-60
(7th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Phillips, 564 F.2d 32, 33-34 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978); United States
v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 657-59 (5th cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); United States v. Harpel,
493 F.2d 346, 348-52 (10th Cir. 1974); Gavin, 446 F.2d at 799; United States v. Traficant, 558 F.
Supp. 996, 1001-02 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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Courts interpreting section 2511(2)(d) usually have focused on one of two issties. 138
One issue, determined at the threshold, is whether the intercepted communication meets
the statutory definition of either an "oral" or "wire communication."'" A second issue
is whether the communication was intercepted for the purpose of committing a criminal
or tortious act."" Roth of these criteria must be met before a court may find a violation
of section 251 1(2)(d).
Courts focusing on the threshold issue of whether a person has intercepted an "oral"
or "wire communication" have reached different conclusions about what sort of oral
communications meet the statutory definition."' To meet the statutory definition, a
person must have a reasonable expectation that his or her conversation is nut subject to
interception." 2 Several appellate courts have stated that this definition of oral commu-
nication tracks the fourth amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" that Katz v.
United States established." 3 Other courts have disagreed, holding that the statutory def-
inition affords more protection than the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy stan-
dard. 144 The courts finding greater protection in the statute have held that, although a
person may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Constitution, a
person may have a justifiable expectation under Title III that his or her conversation is
not subject to interception. 145 This conflict, which centers around the proper interpre-
tation of the statutory requirement that a person have a justifiable expectation that his
or her conversation is not subject to interception, continues today.""
15' Only a few cases have discussed both issues. E.g., Boddie v. ABC, inc„ 731 F.2(1 333, 336-
39 (6th Cir. 1984). The question of whether an "interception" has occurred may also arise. Section
2510(4) defines "intercept." See supra note 90 for the definition of "intercept." Two cases that
discuss this definition are Turk, 526 F.2d at 657-58, and Harpel, 493 F.2(1 at 348-52; see also j.
CARR, supra note 1, § 3.2(c).
09 See supra note 91 for the definition of "oral communication." Many courts assume that all
oral communications meet. the statutory definition, and overlook this criterion. See supra note 90
for the definition of "wire communication:" Another threshold issue is whether a federal court
should even have jurisdiction over the crime alleged. See supra note 108.
140 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
" 1 Compare United States v. Pui Kim Cam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that
the statutory definition of oral communication "tracks" the constitutional definition of a justifiable
expectation of privacy set forth in Katz), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974) and United States v. Hall,
488 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1973) with Boddie v. ABC, Inc., 731 F.2d at 339 n.5, and Benford
v. ARC, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that the statutory definition may
provide more protection than the constitutional standard of a justifiable expectation of privacy),
aff'd, 661 F.2d 917 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981). See also United States v. Carroll,
337 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (D.D.C. 1971) (where the person intercepting the conversation could hear
the nonconsenting party's words without any contrivance or augmentation, no "oral communicati(n"
exists for the purposes of Title III).
144 See supra note 91 for the definition of "oral communication."
" 5 E.g., Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d at 1206; Hall, 488 F.2d at 198-9th see also Fishman, The
Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title 111, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy,
51 Sr. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 54 (1976).
144 E.g., Boddie, 731 F.2d at 339 n.5; Benford, 502 F. Supp. at 1162.
" 5 Boddie, 731 F.2d at 339 n.5; Benford, 502 F. Supp. at 1162.
145 One way to resolve this conflict is to apply the Katz standard only to "oral communications"
that do not involve participant monitoring. Such an application would avoid the problems that
WhitelHoffa line of cases poses. For oral communications involving private participant monitoring,
a different standard is required. This note's "totality of the circumstances" test, developed infra
notes 288-98 and accompanying text, is one possibility.
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Assuming that the intercepted communication meets the statutory definition, a
section 2511(2)(d) violation occurs only when a person also has intercepted the com-
munication for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act."' Many courts have
implied that the tape recording's unlawful purpose must be directed against the non-
consenting party.'" Several courts have held that intercepting for the purpose of black-
mailing the nonconsenting party violates section 2511(2)(d). 19 Other courts have rec-
ognized that intercepting for the purpose of obtaining evidence to invade the privacy of
the nonconsenting party,' 59 or to inflict emotional distress on the nonconsenting party"'
also violates section 2511(2)(d). Other interceptions, in which the interceptor did not
have such an unlawful motive, are lawful.'" Courts have not developed clear standards
for determining the issue of unlawful purpose. Instead, courts have determined that
they will decide the issue on a case-by-case basis.'"
17 See 18 U.S.C. f 251 I(2)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Before the 1986 amendments deleting
the phrase "or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act," courts faced the difficult
issue of determining whether a communication was intercepted for the purpose of committing an
injurious act. In the 1971 decision of Meredith v. Gavin, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that taping a telephone conversation to keep an accurate record of it was not an "injurious act" in
violation of section 2511(2)(d). 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971). The plaintiff in Gavin contended
that the defendant's recording a telephone conversation between himself and the defendant for
the purpose of impeaching the plaintiff's testimony at a worker's compensation hearing constituted
an "injurious act." Id. at 798. The Gavin court disagreed, reasoning that because the defendant
intercepted the communication to protect his own position, and did not intend to harm the
plaintiff's, the interception did not violate section 2511(2)(d). Id. at 799. Interpreting the meaning
of "injurious" act in light of Senator Hart's comments on the Senate floor, supra note 100, the Gavin
court stated:
A perfectly legitimate act may often be injurious. A judgment at law can be
injurious to the losing party ....
... It seems apparent from the context in which the statute was enacted that the
sort of conduct contemplated was an interception by a party to a conversation with an
intent to use that interception against the non-consenting party in some harmful way
and in a manner in which the offending party had no right to proceed.
Id. The Gavin court stated that courts should determine what constitutes an "injurious act" for the
purposes of section 2511(2)(d) on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Although Gavin is a less important decision since the 1986 amendment of section 2511(2)(d),
its description of which unlawful activities section 2511(2)(d) prohibits is still helpful. The Gavin
court held that Congress intended section 2511(2)(d) to prohibit unlawful interceptions in which
the animus of the interceptor was directed toward the nonconsenting party, not toward a third
party. Id. Thus, although the language of section 2511(2)(d) would permit the section to apply to
interceptions with all types of unlawful motives, section 2511(2)(d) was intended to prohibit inter-
ceptions directed at harming the nonconsenting party. Id.
18 See, e.g., Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1978);
Gavin, 446 F.2d at 799.
19 See, e.g., Consumer Elec. Prods. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Colo.
1983); United States v. Traficant, 558 F, Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
158 See, e.g., Brown v. ABC, Inc., 704 F.2d 1296, 1301 (4th Cir. 1983).
151 Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971).
L&2 See, e.g., By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1982) (a desire to
make an accurate record of a conversation to which a person is a party is lawful even if the person
plans to use the recording as evidence).
188 See, e.g., Boddie v. ABC, Inc., 731 F.2d 333, 338 n.4 (6th Cir, 1984); Moore v. Telfon
Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319,
325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Gavin, 446 F.2d at 799.
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Many courts interpreting section 2511(2)(d) have emphasized that to violate the
section, the purpose underlying the interception, not just the purpose underlying the
conversation, must be unlawful.' 54 These courts hold the mere fact that a conversation
concerns criminal or tortious activities does not imply that the purpose underlying its
taping must also be unlawful. 155 Thus, several courts have held that a desire to make an
accurate record of a conversation concerning unlawful activity does not violate section
251I(2)(d), even if the person who intercepted the communication intended to use the
recording as evidence in a lawsuit against the nonconsenting party.t 56
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet interpreted section
2511(2)(d), the private participant monitoring provision, it has interpreted section 2515,
Title ll Fs exclusionary provision, several times.'" The trend in both the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts has been to read the statutory suppression provision in a
flexible, non-technical way. 158 As evidence of this trend, the Supreme Court has held
that, notwithstanding the unconditional language of section 2515, not every violation of
Title III requires suppression.'" Instead, the Court has held that suppression is war-
ranted only for violations of those procedural requirements of Title III that "directly
and substantially implement the Congressional intention" in enacting Title
One example of this Supreme Court trend toward nonliteral interpretation of section
2515 is the 1974 case of United States v. Chavez.' 6 ' In Chavez, the United States Attorney
General authorized an application for a wiretap, but the application and the court order
incorrectly identified an Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing officia1. 162 The
Court held that misidentification, by itself, violated a reporting function designed only
to fix responsibility for the authorization. Because the reporting function did not directly
implement the congressional intent to limit interceptions, the Court admitted the evi-
dence from the wiretap notwithstanding the technical violation of Title 111. 165
Similarly, several lower federal courts have looked beyond a literal reading of Title
III to carve out exceptions to section 2515.' 64 In 1973, in United States v. Liddy, the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia held that the prosecution could use
as evidence in its case-in-chief a tape recording made by a private party, in this case the
defendant, in violation of Title II1. 1 f5 In Liddy, the government was prosecuting the
defendant for violating Title III. The district court conceded that the defendant had
154 E.g., United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1131 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862
(1984); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 659, 657 n.l (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
155 E.g., Thigh°, 731 F.2(1 at 1131; 'Turk, 526 F.2(1 at 657 n.l.
155 See By-Prdd Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1982); Turk, 526 F.2d
at 657 n.l.
157 E.g., United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432-40 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 562, 571-80 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-29 (1974).
' See, e.g., Chavez, 416 U.S. at 571-80; see Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 56-117; see also United
States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (dictum); United States v. Liddy,
354 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (D.D.C. 1973).
159 Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting United States v, Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527).
ItIO Id.
1 61 416 U.S. at 571-80.
162 1d, at 565-66.
Id. at 579-80.
164 E.g., United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (dictum);
United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (D.D.C. 1973).
' 65 354 F. Supp. at 221.
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complied with the literal statutory criteria for suppression. The district court nevertheless
rejected the motion to suppress evidence derived from the unlawful taping. 166
 The court
reasoned that, if it did not permit the prosecution to use this evidence at trial, the
government could never successfully prosecute persons who violated Title III because
the same statute would also prohibit disclosing the evidence derived from the intercep-
tion.' 67 The court concluded that, if it adopted the defendants' argument, the statute
would be "self-emasculating." 168 Although the court recognized that divulging the evi-
dence at trial might invade the defendants' constitutional right to privacy, the court
noted that the right to control the admission of evidence at trial is often subordinated
to society's interest in successfully prosecuting criminals. Accordingly, the district court
held that a limited exception to a literal reading of the statute was required in order to
prosecute the illegal wiretapper.
Apart from the exception carved out by the Liddy court, most other courts have
assumed without discussion that section 2515, the statutory exclusionary rule, applies to
all violations of 25I 1(2)(d), regardless of who uses the evidence.' 69 In the 1976 decision
of United States v. Phillips, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected the
prosecution's argument that a tape made in violation of section 251I(2)(d) should none-
theless he admissible where the government was an innocent recipient of the tape and
not the procurer. 179 The Phillips court reasoned that, because section 2515 involves a
specific statutory directive and not an interpretation of the fourth amendment's exclu-
sionary rule, the fact that the government inadvertently discovered the evidence, and
was not the unlawful procurer, was irrelevant.' 71
In the 1983 case of United States v. Traficant, the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, without specifically discussing the innocent recipient issue,
disagreed with the result in Phittips. 172 In Traficant, the district court stated that the
prosecution may use evidence from an interception made in violation of section
2511(2)(d). 175 The Traficant court reasoned that Congress did not intend discussions of
criminal activity to lie within the statute's protected privacy interests.
In Traficant, the government prosecuted the defendant for violating the Racketeer-
ing Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.'" A man named Carrabia had recorded
his conversations with the defendant.'" The defendant argued that, because Carrabia
made these tapes for the purpose of blackmailing him, sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515
required their suppression. 176
166 id.
197 Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Liddy court relied on the Senate Report accompanying
Title III. In particular, the court relied on the Report's statement that law enforcement officers
may disclose the contents of illegally intercepted communications to other officers, and use the
contents of such communications to the extent appropriate to the proper performance of their
duties. Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2188).
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261,270-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107
(1982).
17° 540 F.2d 319,327 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
171 Id.
172 United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996,1001-02 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (dictum).
ITS 558 F. Supp. at 1001-02.
174 Id. at 998.
"5 Id.
176 Id. at 999-1000.
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The district court rejected the defendant's claim, ruling that the defendant had not
carried his burden of proving the unlawful motive underlying the taping.'" The court
also stated, however, that even if Carrabia made the tapes in order to blackmail the
defendant, it should not interpret section 2511(2)(d) so as to result in suppression of the
tapes.'" The Traficant court, interpreting sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515 in light of Title
111's stated purpose of combatting organized crime, held that barring admission of the
tapes under these circumstances would "add a new category tti the list of protected
privacy interests — illegal activities."'"
Another generally recognized exception to section 2515 allows the prosecution to
use evidence obtained from interceptions made in violation of Title III for impeachment
purposes. 18° This exception to the statutory exclusionary provision, based on the excep-
tion to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, arises directly out of Title 111's legislative
history.' 81 The Senate Report states that section 2515 should "largely reflect existing law"
and that section 2515 should not extend the scope of the suppression rule beyond
current search and seizure law. 182 The Report then cites with approval case law that
established a limited exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule by permitting
the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure for impeachment
purposes.'" Courts have generally found that this specific reference in the legislative
history is sufficient support for engrafting the same exception onto Title 111. 184
In summary, courts disagree over the proper interpretation of section 2515. Some
courts construe the statute literally, and suppress all evidence obtained from an unlawful
interception. Other courts reject a literal application of Title Ill. Instead, these courts
construe the statute in accord with its purposes, and admit evidence when suppression
would not promote Title Ill's purposes of fighting crime and protecting legitimate,
material, privacy interests.
111. A RECENT CONFLICT CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2515 TO
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 251 1(2)(D): UNITED STATES V. UNDERHILL AND UNITED STATES
V. VEST
Two 1987 decisions illustrate the divergent results that occur in private participant
monitoring cases. In United States v. Underhill, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that interceptors and their co-conspirators waive any right to privacy protected by Title
111, 185 The court therefore denied the defendants' motion to suppress.' 88 In contrast, in
United States v. Vest, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that an interceptor's co-
conspirator has a genuine privacy right in the contents of conversations intercepted for
177 Id. at 1001. The defendant has the burden of proving an impermissible purpose by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1000.
178 Id. at 1001-02.
179 1d. at 1002.
' 8° United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1154 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011
(1983); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1973).
181 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2185.
"2 Id.
'" SENATE REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2185. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)
established the exception.
1134 See, e.g., Caron, 474 F.2d at 509-10.
1 " 813 F.2d 105, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 107, 113.
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the purpose of furthering their criminal conspiracy.'" The Vest court therefore granted
the defendant's motion to suppress because it found that disclosure at trial would violate
further the defendant's privacy right.'" Although both courts stated that they were
interpreting Title III in accord with its purposes, the courts emphasized different pur-
poses to reach conflicting results.'"
The Underhill court held that a person who unlawfully records a conversation — an
interceptor — waives any right of privacy protected by Title III by his or her act of
unlawful recording.'" The court also, held that an interceptor's co-conspirator is bound
by the interceptors' acts and therefore waives his or her right to privacy in any com-
munications made to further the conspiracy. 191 Recognizing that the tapes were made in
violation of Title III, the court nevertheless reasoned that a literal application of sections
2511(2)(d) and 2515 would produce an absurd result that Congress could not have
intended. 192
In Underhill, the defendant and his co-defendants were indicted for conspiracy and
various substantive offenses related to the ownership and operation of an illegal gambling
business.'" Defendants Underhill and Rokitka had recorded telephone conversations
with persons wishing to place bets with the defendants. 194 Because these recordings
created a gambling record as defined under Tennessee law, the defendants argued that
they had violated the Tennessee law that makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly make,
store or possess a gambling record. 195 The defendants further argued that they had
intercepted wire communications for the purpose of committing a criminal act in vio-
lation of section 2511(2)(d). Finally, as aggrieved persons as defined in section 2510(11),
the defendants claimed standing to seek suppression pursuant to section 2515 on the
grounds that the communications were intercepted unlawfully."
The court of appeals first stated that, if the purpose of the taping was merely to
memorialize the transaction, the taping might be deemed a noncriminal act.'" Because
the transactions were unlawful in themselves, the court reasoned, recording them did
not make them more incriminating. 198 According to the court, when the purpose of an
interception is to preserve an accurate record of an event in order to prevent future
distortion by a participant, the interception is generally lawful.'" But because the taping
itself constituted a criminal offense under Tennessee law, the court reluctantly ruled
that the defendants had violated section 2511(2)(d). 200
Notwithstanding this ruling, the court held that defendant interceptors waive any
right of privacy protected by Title III."' The court recognized that one of section 2515's
187
 813 F.2d 477, 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1987).
188 Id. at 481.
18"
	 813 F.2d at 480-84; Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112-13.
”' 813 F.2d at 112.
1 " Id.
192 Id.
1" Id. at 107.
I" Id.
198 Id. at 112.
1118 Id. at 108.
197 1d. at 110.
198 Id. at 111.
199 id, at 110.
21" /d. at 111.
2111 Id. at 112.
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purposes is to protect against invasions of personal privacy. The court noted, however,
that Congress was concerned with protecting the victims of such invasions, not the
perpetrators. 202 According to the court, to apply the language of sections 2511(2)(d) and
2515 literally and thereby allow defendants Underhill and Rokitka to suppress evidence
from tape recordings that they made would allow an absurd result that Congress did
not intend.203 Rather than allow this absurd result, the Underhill court denied the defen-
dants' motion, reasoning that denial would be more in harmony with Title III's purposes.
In addition to ruling that the evidence was admissible against the interceptors, the
court held that defendant Person, whose voice was on the tape, but who had not
participated in making the tapes, also waived his right to privacy. 204 Because the taping
furthered a conspiracy of which Person was a member, the court held that Person was
bound by his co-conspirators' actions. 205 Therefore, the court also denied defendant
Person's motion to suppress. 206
The Underhill court rejected the defendants' literal reading of Title III. The court
stated that Congress did not create Title III so that violators could use its suppression
provision to shield themselves from the consequences of other unlawful activities. 207
Instead of interpreting the statute literally, the court examined the purposes underlying
Title III — combatting crime and protecting privacy — and interpreted the statute in a
way that the court found furthered those purposes. The court noted that literal appli-
cation would provide an unintended benefit to organized crime. 206 In addition, according
to the court, the defendants had no genuine privacy right at stake. 209 The Underhill
court, therefore, denied the defendants' motion to suppress by holding that interceptors
and their co-conspirators waive any rights of privacy that Title III was meant to protect.
In United States v. Vest, another 1987 case construing the reach of section 2515 in
conjunction with section 2511(2)(d), the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed a Massachusetts district court's partial grant of the defendant's motion
to suppress. 210 The district court found that a man named Jesse James Waters recorded
a conversation in order to further a criminal conspiracy. 21 ' Therefore, the district court
held that sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515 required suppressing evidence derived from the
recording in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 212 The district court rejected the prosecu-
tion's argument that the court should read an exception into section 2515 for evidence
that the prosecution has obtained inadvertently. 21S On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision. 214 Noting that section 2515 served different pur-
poses than the judicially-created exclusionary rule, the appeals court agreed with the






207 1d. at 111-13.
"8 Id,
209 See id.
210 813 F.2d 477, 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1987).
211
	
F. Supp. 899, 907-08 (D. Mass. 1986).
212 1d. at 911, 912, 914-15.
212 Id. at 913-15.
214 813 F.2d at 981, 484.
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ipant monitoring would "eviscerate the statutory protection of privacy from intrusion
by illegal private interception." Y 18
In Vest, the police arrested Waters in May 1983 and charged him with several crimes
arising from the shooting of Boston Police Officer Francis Tarantino. 218 Prior to his trial
in October of 1984, Waters met with Tarantino and George Vest, another Boston Police
detective 217 They agreed that Waters would pay Tarantino $300,000 in exchange for
Tarantino's efforts to "fix" the case against Waters. On June 15, 1984, Vest met with
Waters at Waters's office.'" Waters gave Vest $35,000 for Tarantino. Waters recorded
the transaction and the accompanying conversation to create a receipt in the event that
Vest double-crossed him, or Tarantino later claimed that Waters had failed to make the
payment:218 In October 1984, Waters was tried and convicted in Suffolk Superior Court
on several charges relating to Tarantino's shooting. 220 In November 1984, he was sen-
tenced to eight to ten years at MCI-Walpole. 22 ' In December 1984, Waters gave the tape
to a federal agent. 222
After receiving the tape, the federal law enforcement authorities began investigating
the payoff scheme. 223 They called Vest to testify before the grand jury concerning his
role in the scheme. Although Vest was given immunity, he denied that he had ever
participated in a payoff scheme and stated that he had never received any money from
Waters. The June 1983 tape recording was then played for the grand jury, who subse-
quently indicted Vest on three counts of making false statements to a grand jury. 224
Before his trial for perjury, Vest moved to suppress the tape. 228 Vest claimed that
Waters's recording of the illegal transaction furthered their conspiracy. 226 The defendant
also claimed that having a receipt was simply preliminary to the purpose of blackmailing
Tarantino to enforce the agreement. 227 Either purpose, the defendant claimed, violated
section 2511(2)(d). 228 Because the interception was unlawful, the defendant argued that
introducing the tape recording into evidence would violate section 2515. 222
At the motion to suppress hearing, the prosecution raised several defenses. The
prosecution first argued that, because Waters recorded the tape as a receipt to protect
himself' against double-crossing by Vest, Tarantino, or both, the recording had a lawful
purpose. 28° The prosecution's second defense, analogizing to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, was that even if Waters's interception violated section 2511(2)(d), the
court should admit the evidence because the prosecution was the inadvertent recipient,
213 Id. at 481.
210 639 F. Supp. at 906.
217 Id.
218 Id.
213 Id. at 907.
22° Id. at 906.
221 Id .
222 Id. at 907 .
223 Vest, 813 F.2d at 479.
221 Id.
223 Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 901.





229 1d, at 901 .
230 Id. at 905.
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rather than the procurer of the illegal recording.]"' The prosecution noted that allowing
into evidence the Fruits of unlawful private actions that the police obtain inadvertently
was already a well-established exception to the judicially-created fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. 292 The government's third defense, again analogizing to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, urged the court to carve out of section 2515 an exception
for perjury prosecutions."' Finally, the prosecution argued that, if it could not use the
tape in its case-in-chief, it should be allowed to use the tape to impeach the defendant's
testimony should the defendant take the stand. 2 "4 The court denied all of the govern-
ment's arguments except for the last one."'
The district court agreed with the government that Waters made the tape as a
receipt, but nevertheless Found that this purpose encompassed the subsidiary purpose
of furthering his conspiratorial plan. 2"s Taping to further a conspiracy, the court said,
was taping for the purpose of committing a criminal, tortious or other injurious act, and
violated section 2511(2)(d). 2" Therefore, the court found that section 2515 required
suppressing the evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief.""
In responding to the prosecution's remaining three defenses, the district court
examined both Tide III's legislative history and the case law that existed when Congress
enacted Title III. 239 The district court also stressed that its task was to construe a statutory
exclusionary rule, not the judicially-Fashioned fourth amendment exclusionary 1rux. 240
Accordingly, the district court emphasized the fact that Congress intended the statutory
exclusionary provision to protect privacy as well as deter potential unlawful intercep-
tors."'
The district court rejected the prosecution's argument that section 2515 did not
apply when the government was the innocent recipient, rather than the procurer, of the
illegal tape. 242 The court held that neither precedent nor legislative history supported
the prosecution's contention that the coui• should create an exception for innocent
recipients. 24" The district court concluded that carving out an innocent recipient excep-
tion would eviscerate Title III's priacY protection. 244
The district court distinguished United Slates v. Liddy, in which a federal district court
allowed the prosecution to use a tape recording made illegally by a private party."' In
Liddy, the government used the recording to prosecute the interceptor for violating Title
III.246 In Vest, the prosecution claimed that Liddy demonstrated that section 2515 does
nut provide a blanket prohibition against the prosecution's use of private, unlawfully
231 Id. at 913.
232 See id.
233 639 F. Supp. at 908, 911-12.
237 Id, at 908, 910.
2" Id. at 908, 911, 915.
236 Id. at 908.
257 Id.
2" Id. at 911, 915.
239 Id. at 909-14.
2" fd. at 910.
2" Id. at 914.
242 Id,
273 Id.
244 Id. at 914-15.
24"
	
at 914. For a discussion of Liddy, see supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
248 United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.D.C, 1973).
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intercepted communications. 247 Although the district court acknowledged the Liddy ex-
ception, it stated that the Liddy decision necessarily flowed from the text of the statute
and its legislative history. 248 The district court concluded that Liddy did not even imply
the innocent recipient exception that the prosecution sought. 249
The court also rejected the government's contention that, because exclusion under
these circumstances would not serve any deterrent purposes, exclusion would not sub-
stantially implement the congressional intention in enacting Title 111. 230 The court in-
stead agreed with the defendants that exclusion would promote a central, fundamental
and substantive statutory purpose — protecting privacy.231 The district court warned
that the prosecution's construction of the statute would not protect against invasions of
privacy occurring when one person engages a private investigator to gather evidence to
take to the government for use in a criminal prosecution.232
In addition to the government's argument based on precedent, the government
presented legislative history indicating that courts should confine the sanction against
private consent recording to tort remedies and the exclusion of any evidence the unlawful
procurer attempted to introduce. 233 Because this legislative history reflected discussion
about preliminary versions of Title III, however, and was not part of the official legislative
history, the court questioned its probative value. 234 Finding the prosecution's legislative
history argument "far from persuasive on the issue," the court rejected the prosecution's
argument that Congress only intended to prevent the procurer of illegal interceptions
from introducing into evidence the fruits of his or her unlawful taping. 233
The district court also rejected the government's third argument that, like the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, section 2515 should contain an exception for perjury
prosecutions. 256 The court ruled that the legislative history permitting the impeachment
exception did not authorize the courts to develop and apply exceptions to section 2515
to the same extent as courts develop and apply exceptions to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. 237 Although the court conceded that the issue was a close one, it
concluded that neither Title 111's language nor its legislative history warranted granting
the courts such sweeping discretion. 238
The district court did hold, however, that the prosecution could use the illegal
recording to impeach the defendant should he take the stand. 239 In deciding for the
prosecution on this issue, the court was persuaded by the precedent in support of this
exception and by the legislative history. The court concluded that because the legislative
history specifically cited Walder, the case that established the impeachment exception to
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, Congress intended Title III to recognize the
24? 639 F. Supp. at 914; Brief for Appellant at 17, United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477.
248 639 F. Supp. at 914 .
"9 Id.
250 Id.
251 Vest, 639 F. Supp. at 914.
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same exception. Thus, the district court in Vest found that the prosecution could only
use the tape to impeach the defendant should he take the stand.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's
partial grant of the defendant's motion to suppress. 260 The prosecution raised two of
the three claims that the district court had rejected. 2" The prosecution argued that
section 2515 should not apply when the government is merely the innocent recipient,
and not the procurer of the tape. 262 The prosecution also claimed that section 2515
should recognize an exception for perjury prosecutions.2" The court of appeals rejected
both of the prosecution's arguments, using essentially the same rationale as the district
court. 264
The court of appeals first stated that the congressionally-created rule of section
2515 served different purposes than the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 265 Ac-
cording to the circuit court, the purpose underlying section 2515 was not just to deter
Title III violations, but also to protect personal privacy. 266 An invasion of privacy has
not ended when an interception occurs, the court stated, but is compounded by disclosure
in court or elsewhere. 267 That the disclosing party is merely the innocent recipient, and
not the interceptor, the Vest court stated, does not lessen the impact of an invasion of
privacy. 266 The court therefore rejected the innocent recipient argument. Agreeing with
the lower court, the circuit court reasoned that carving out this exception would evis-
cerate Title II I's ability to protect privacy. 26°
The court of appeals also rejected the argument that section 2515 should recognize
an exception for perjury prosecutions. 270 The circuit court agreed with the lower perjury
prosecutions. The circuit court agreed with the lower perjury prosecutions. The circuit
court agreed with the lower perjury prosecutions. The circuit court agreed with the
lower court that neither the case law that existed when Congress enacted Title III nor
the legislative history supported such an exception. 2" Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's partial grant of the defendant's motion to suppress. 272
The Underhill and Vest courts reached different results in applying Title II I's exclu-
sionary rule to private participant monitoring. The Underhill court held that interceptors
and their co-conspirators waive any right to privacy that Congress intended Title 111 to
protect. 273 The Vest court, in contrast, held that an interceptor's co-conspirator has a
legitimate privacy right in the contents of tapes intercepted in the furtherance of their
286 81'3 F.2d at 479. For the purposes of taking the appeal, the government moved to sever one
of the perjury counts. Id. at 480. The case proceeded to trial on the other two counts, and Vest was
convicted on both counts. Id.





205 Id. at 481.
2011 Id. at 480-81.
267 /d. at 481.
288 Id.
26"
270 1d. at 482-84.
2" Id. at 481-84.
272 Id. at 484.
273 Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
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conspiracy. 271 Both courts stated that they interpreted the statute in harmony with its
purposes.275 Notwithstanding these claims, the decisions reflect different views on the
relative importance of Title III's purposes. The Underhill court showed a great concern
for fighting crime, and less interest in the privacy rights of participants in conversations
concerning criminal activities that a co-conspirator intercepts. 276 The Vest court, in con-
trast, based its decision largely on the privacy interests of a participant whose conversation
a co-conspirator taped for the purpose of furthering their conspiracy. 277
IV. FURTHERING TITLE III'S PURPOSES IN CASES INVOLVING EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM
UNLAWFUL PRIVATE PARTICIPANT MONITORING
In 1987, two United States Courts of Appeals reached inconsistent results applying
section 2515, Title III's suppression provision, to violations of section 2511(2)(d), the
provision that limits private participant monitoring. 279 The courts emphasized different
purposes of Title III to reach their decisions. 279
 Courts would reach more consistent
results by applying a common framework to cases involving evidence obtained in violation
of section 2511(2)(d).
This note suggests a two step .framework for courts to use in cases involving the
suppression of evidence derived from unlawful private participant monitoring. Under
this framework, courts should first examine the intercepted conversation to ensure that
it meets the statutory definition of a wire or oral communication. If the conversation
meets the initial requirement, courts should next examine the relationship among the
party seeking to suppress, the proponent of the evidence and the intercepted commu-
nication. Where the party seeking to suppress is also the interceptor, a court should
deny the motion to suppress. Where the proponent of the evidence is the unlawful
interceptor, however, and the party seeking to suppress is the nonconsenting participant,
a court should grant the motion. Where neither the person seeking to suppress nor the
proponent of the evidence is the unlawful interceptor, a court should suppress the
evidence only if disclosure at trial would harm a material privacy interest of the party
seeking suppression. This framework strikes the proper balance between the often
conflicting goals of Title III — providing evidence to combat crime and protecting
personal privacy.
A. A Framework
For the purposes of presenting this framework, assume that a private citizen has
intercepted a communication in violation of section 2511(2)(d). The interceptor may be
a defendant, a proponent of the intercepted evidence, or a third party. Assume that the
defendant has filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from the interception.
2" See Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81.
2" Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-84; Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112-13.
'-'76 Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
277 Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81.
478 Compare Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (finding no right of privacy in tapes made in furtherance
of the conspiracy) with Vest, 813 F.2d at 481 (assuming without discussion that Vest, the co-conspir-
ator of the interceptor, had a right to privacy in a tape made in furtherance of the conspiracy).
272 Compare Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (emphasizing the protection of only legitimate privacy
interests and using Title III to secure evidence for prosecuting criminals) with Vest, 813 F.2d at 481
(emphasizing the protection of privacy).
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Further assume that the defendant was one of the parties to the intercepted communi-
cation.
The framework first requires that the intercepted conversation meet the statutory
definition of a "wire" or "oral communication." 280 The definitions restrict the conversa-
tions protected by Title III to those that are uttered under circumstances in which people
legitimately should expect privacy protection. Requiring that defendants demonstrate a
reasonable belief that their oral communications were not subject to interception permits
only persons with genuine privacy interests to use section 2515. Because Congress
enacted Title III to protect legitimate privacy interests, defendants who lack such an
interest should not be able to use Title 111. 281
The definition of "oral communication," however, is difficult to apply in participant
monitoring cases. The language of the definition is vagUe.282 Deciding precisely when a
person "exhibit[s] an expectation that [a] communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such an expectation" requires some guesswork. In addi-
tion to vague language, Title III's legislative history creates more uncertainty regarding
under what circumstances oral statements will meet the statutory definition. 288
The Senate Report states that the definition of an "oral communication" was meant
to reflect existing law, and cites Katz a. United States as an illustration.284
 As the Supreme
Court has applied Katz to participant monitoring, however, a person does not have a
reasonable expectation that a party to a conversation will not record 11. 283
 Thus, strict
application of Katz would exclude all private participant monitoring of oral conversations
from the statutory definition.
This absurd result	 reading section 2511(2)(d) completely out of Title III in cases
involving oral communication — clearly is not what Congress intended. Both the lan-
guage of section 251 I (2)(d) and its stated purposes demonstrate that, Congress intended
to protect oral as well as wire communications. 28° Consequently, courts must focus on
other portions of the legislative history in order to interpret the proper scope of "oral
communication" in private participant monitoring cases.
The Senate Report also states in its description of "oral communication" that the
expectation is "to be gathered anti evaluated from and in terms of all the facts and
circumstances."287
 This vague directive apparently calls for the application of a "totality
of the circumstances test" to determine if a person's expectation that his or her com-
munication is not subject to interception is justified. 288
 Rather than apply Katz literally
and interpret the legislative history to read section 2511(2)(d) completely out of Title
III, courts should apply this test.
28° See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 90, 91 for the texts
of these definitions.
28 ' See SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2178.
282 See supra note 91 for the definition of "oral communication."
283 See SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2178. See supra note 91-92 and accompanying text for
a discussion of which oral communications meet the statutory definition.
28a
	 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178 (citing Katz, 389 U,S. 347 (1967)).
28s
	 States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
286 Senator Hart's comments certainly suggest that section 2511(2)(d) was intended to apply to
oral communications. For the text of Senator Hart's statements, see supra rime 100.
287 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178.
288 See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968) (applying a totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether a defendant's statement was made voluntarily).
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Under the totality of the circumstances test, courts should consider the factors listed
in the legislative history of oral communication. A defendant's subjective intent and the
place where the communication was uttered are important factors. 289
 Outside of his or
her own home or office, a defendant's expectation of privacy warrants less protection. 2"
In particular, a defendant's expectation would clearly be unjustified in a jail cell or an
"open field." 291
 Even when in his or her own home or office, however, a defendant's
expectation would be unwarranted under certain circumstances. For example, a defen-
dant's expectation would be unjustified if he or she speaks too loudly. 292
This test also should include other factors not mentioned in the legislative history.
The subject matter of the conversation is important. 295 Courts historically have been
loathe to afford much privacy protection to conversations concerning ongoing criminal
activity. 294
 Furthermore, Congress enacted Title III in part for the purpose of fighting
crime by providing law enforcement with the means to obtain probative evidence. 295
Particularly in criminal prosecutions, therefore, courts should not discard too quickly
evidence that may be not only probative and relevant, but also accurate and reliable. 296
The personal relationship between the participants is also an important factor."' A
defendant's expectation that his or her conversation is not subject to interception may
be justified if a close friend or business colleague intercepts their conversation. 299 When
a defendant converses with a stranger, or a mere acquaintance, and the stranger or
acquaintance intercepts the conversation, however, the legitimacy of the defendant's
expectation diminishes.
After ensuring that the wire or oral communication meets the statutory definition,
courts should next examine the relationship among the party seeking suppression, the
proponent of the evidence and the intercepted communication. This note will consider
three possible interrelationships: 1) the person seeking to suppress — the defendant —
is also the unlawful interceptor; 2) the proponent of the evidence is the unlawful
interceptor; and 3) neither the person seeking to suppress nor the proponent is the
unlawful interceptor. If a defendant — in this hypothetical also the person seeking to
suppress — is also the interceptor, the court should deny the motion. 299 A court should
289 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178.
299 See id; see also Fishman, supra note 143, at 57 (a person's expectation of privacy is not
reasonable when he or she is on a criminal associate's premises and that criminal associate has
consented to the interception).
991 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2178. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's "open fields"
doctrine, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
292 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2178.
995 See, e.g., Benford v. ABC, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D. Md. 1980) ("one contemplating
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police") (quoting
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971)), aff'd, 661 F.2d 917 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1060 (1981).
294 Id.
295 SENATE REPORT, 51119/12 note I, at 2117.
2'56 See White, 401 U.S. at 753.
297 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 224.
298 See id.
299 See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484,
3268 (1987), 108 S. Ct. 81, 141 (1988); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.D.C. 1973).
Analysis of the case in which the defendant is also the interceptor should be confined to cases
involving only wire communications. Any person who intercepts his or her own oral communication
would not have a legitimate expectation that such communication was not subject to interception
September 1988]	 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE	 931
find that interceptors waive any right to privacy that Congress intended Title III to
protect. Suppressing evidence under these circumstances, although warranted by a literal
application of Title III, would not promote Title III's objectives."
Literal application of Title III requires suppression in cases in which the defendant
seeks to suppress evidence that he or she has obtained in violation of section 25I 1(2)(d). 301
An interceptor has standing because he or she was a party to an intercepted communi-
cation." In addition, because the communication was unlawfully intercepted, the de-
fendant satisfies the criteria for suppression pursuant to section 2518(10)(a)." Section
2515, therefore, seems to require that the court exclude the evidence." 1 Literal appli-
cation under these circumstances, however, leads to one of two absurd results. One
absurdity is that defendants who have violated Title III could never be prosecuted or
sued successfully because the same statute would prohibit admitting evidence derived
from the unlawful interceptions against the defendants, and render Title III "self-
emasculating."3°5 The second absurdity occurs when a defendant is on trial for violating
a law other than Title III." Granting the motion to suppress would allow such a
defendant to use Title III's provisions to shield him or herself from the consequences
of other unlawful acts." Allowing persons who violate Title III's provisions to use the
same statute's suppression provision as a shield is also absurd." When literal application
of a statute would lead to an absurd result, courts instead should interpret the statute
in accordance with its purposes. 3"9
Title III has two purposes: combatting organized crime and protecting the privacy
of innocent persons' wire and oral communications. 310 Suppressing tape recordings of a
defendant's conversations, which he or she made in violation of Title III, would directly
contravene both purposes. 3" Suppression would allow a defendant to use Title III to
benefit, rather than hinder organized crime. 312 Moreover, granting a defendant's motion
would not protect any genuine privacy right of the defendants. 313 A defendant who
intercepts his or her own telephone conversations for unlawful purposes demonstrates
and thus, the intercepted communication would not meet the statutory definition. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1982 Sc Supp. IV 1986).
"° See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
"I See id. at 110-11.
3" See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 118 For the text of Title
Ill's standing provision. The best solution to the problem of an interceptor trying to suppress the
evidence derived from his or her own unlawful acts is to hold that the interceptor does not have
standing. An interceptor is hardly "aggrieved" under traditional notions of standing. See United
States v. Bragan, 499 F.2d 1376, 1380 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding no standing under these circum-
stances); accord McQuade v. Michael Gassner Mechanical, 587 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 n.1 (D. Conn.
1984).
3" See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). See supra note 119 for the text of section 2518(10)(a).
'04 See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111.
"5 See United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.D.C. 1973).
so° See, e.g., Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111-12.
"7 Id. at 112.
30' See id.
3" See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940); United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979).
315 SENATE REPURT, supra note I, at 2153, 2157.
311 See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111-12.
/d. at 112.
313 See id.
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little concern for the privacy of his or her wire communications." 4
 Therefore, intercep-
tion should constitute a waiver of any privacy interest that Title Ill was meant to
protect. 3 ' 6
 Instead of protecting the privacy of innocent persons, suppression under
these circumstances would allow those who violate Title III to use the same statute to
shield themselves from the consequences of their illegal acts." 6
In addition to contravening Title III's general purposes, allowing interceptors to
suppress the fruits of their own unlawful acts does not further the narrower purposes
of section 2515, the statutory exclusionary rule."' Congress enacted this rule to deter
persons from violating Title III and to prohibit the invasion of personal privacy that
disclosure at trial causes." 8
 Allowing an interceptor to suppress evidence that he or she
has obtained by violating Title III would not deter the interceptor." 9 In fact, allowing
persons to suppress in order to shield themselves from the consequences of other illegal
acts encourages more Title III violations. 320 In addition, the interceptor has waived any
right to privacy protected by Title J11. 321
 Disclosure at trial would not, therefore, harm
any legitimate privacy interest.
When the proponent of electronic surveillance evidence is also the interceptor,
however, and the defendant is the nonconsenting party, courts should grant the motion
to suppress. For instance, suppose a proponent-plaintiff sues the defendant for libel.
Further suppose that, when the plaintiff conducted the private participant monitoring,
he or she had an unlawful purpose, such as blackmailing the defendant. Later, however,
the plaintiff decided to use the evidence in a civil suit against the defendant, and the
defendant moved to suppress it, Under these circumstances, both the language of Title
III, and its underlying policies warrant suppression of the evidence.
As detailed above,s 22 the defendant literally has fulfilled Title 111's requirements for
suppression. Furthermore, unlike the situation in which the defendant is the interceptor,
suppression would promote both policies underlying section 2515, the statutory exclu-
sionary provision, by deterring unlawful interceptors and by protecting personal privacy.
Suppression would further section 2515's deterrent purpose by not permitting those
who violate section 2511(2)(d), the private participant monitoring provision, to use the
fruits of their unlawful acts. 323
 Suppression would also further section 2515's goal of
protecting personal privacy by preventing the disclosure at trial of the contents of the
unlawfully intercepted communications. 324
 Disclosure at trial compounds the original
invasion of privacy caused by the unlawful interception.323
This is not a case in which the plaintiff has intercepted a conversation for the






	 SENATE REPORT, supra note I , at 2184-85.
515 Id. For the legislative history accompanying section 2515, see supra note 127.
513 See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
32 ° See id. at 111-12.
1121 Id. at 112.
1122 See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
525 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2156, 2184-85.
524 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
525 Id.
325
 Cf. By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1982).
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purpose in recording was unlawful, and thus violated Title III. A court should not allow
the perpetrator to use the fruits of his or her unlawful actions." 27 Therefore, because
both the statute's language and its underlying purposes warrant it, a court should
suppress the evidence obtained by violating section 251 1(2)(d) when the unlawful inter-
ceptor later attempts to introduce the evidence at trial.
The final relationship among a defendant, proponent of the evidence and inter-
cepted communication is one in which neither the defendant nor the proponent of the
evidence is the unlawful interceptor. More specifically, the defendant is the victim, not
the perpetrator of an interception that violates section 2511(2)(d), and the proponent is
the innocent recipient of the evidence. Courts should suppress evidence under these
circumstances only when disclosure at trial would harm a material privacy right of the
defendant — a privacy right distinct from and in addition to the right to control public
disclosure of personal information.
Applied literally, Title 111 requires suppression regardless of whether the proponent
is the innocent recipient or the unlawful procurer.'" The legislative history, however,
suggests the possibility that Title 111 should recognize an exception, analogous to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule's,'" for evidence that a private person intercepted
unlawfully and the police subsequently obtained inadvertently.'" To date, two courts,
327 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2156.
328 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81.
329 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1983).
339 First, section 2515 states that evidence derived from an intercepted communication may be
introduced in court only if Title III authorizes its admission, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Section 2517(2) authorizes prosecutors who have obtained knowledge of the contents of
intercepted communications by any means authorized by Title Ill to use such contents to the
extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of [their] official duties." Id. § 2517(2).
Arguably, "performance of [their] duties" includes introducing evidence that they have innocently
received. Section 2517(3), in contrast, allows any person to disclose in court evidence derived from
electronic surveillance only if such person received the evidence by means authorized by Title III
and if the communication was intercepted in accordance with Title Ill. Id. 2517(3). Therefore,
because section 2517(2) does not contain the requirement that the interception itself was lawful,
perhaps section 2517(2) authorizes the innocent recipient exception for criminal trials.
At a minimum, section 2517(21's meaning with respect to cases in which the government is the
innocent recipient is unclear. Arguably, because section 2517(3) specifically authorizes divulgence
at trial, then section 2517(2) only authorizes divulgence among law enforcement personnel. Another
point of uncertainty is that, regardless of whether a private person intercepts a communication
lawfully or unlawfully, if the police inadvertently recover it, the police have obtained the contents
in a means neither expressly authorized nor prohibited by Title III. Consequently, it is difficult to
see where Title Il I authorizes the admission or evidence derived from interceptions lawfully effected
pursuant to sections 25I1(2)(c) or 2511(2)(d). See United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 324 (7th
Cir.), cent, denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979) (although section 25I5's meaning is unclear with respect to
evidence derived from section 2511(2)(c) interceptions, such evidence should be admitted because
section 2515 is intended to exclude only evidence that was intercepted unlawfully).
The official legislative history of section 2515 creates more uncertainty. It states that section
2515 was not meant "to press the scope of the suppression role [sic] beyond present search and
seizure law." SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2185. This statement is anomalous because much of
section 2515 did extend 1968 search and seizure law. See United States v. Manuszak, 438 F. Supp.
613, 616-17 (l .D. Pa. 1977). In particulaCsection 2515 extended prior law by suppressing evidence
derived from private unlawful acts, and by suppressing evidence at civil trials. See Goldsmith, supra
note 16, at 40 & n.232. One commentator states that the reference to "present search and seizure
law" was meant to ensure the retention of certain common law exceptions to suppression, such as
attenuation of the taint and use for impeachment. Id. at 40 n.232. In 1968, pursuant to one well-
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relying on Title III's plain meaning and on its stated concern for protecting personal
privacy, have rejected the argument that Title III should recognize the innocent recipient
exception."'
Title III should not recognize the bright line innocent recipient exception. Such an
exception contravenes the express language of Title III. 4i addition, the legislative
history, although it suggests the possibility of the innocent recipient exception is, at best,
inconclusive.'" Although Title III should not recognize the bright line exception, it
should allow innocent recipients to use the evidence under certain circumstances. Section
2515 has two purposes: deterring Title III violations and protecting the privacy of
innocent persons.'" By preventing interceptors from using evidence that they obtained
unlawfully, section 2515 would deter these wrongdoers.334 By preventing the disclosure
in court of evidence that may invade the defendants' privacy, section 2515 would protect
personal privacy.'" Courts should suppress evidence only when it directly and substan-
tially implements these purposes. 336
Suppressing evidence obtained innocently, however, promotes only one of the two
purposes underlying section 2515 — protecting privacy. 337 If the prosecution has inno-
established common law exception to the exclusionary rule, the police could use evidence that a
private person not acting under color of law had obtained unlawfully. See Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1921). The legislative history to section 2515, therefore, also suggests the
possibility that Title III should contain the innocent recipient exception. Bu! see State of Michigan
v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 974, 978 (F.D. Mich. 1987) (following the quashing of a grand jury subpoena
because of Title III violations, the district court held that section 2515 did not violate the tenth
amendment). The Meese decision shed little light on the innocent recipient question, however, as
the decision focused mainly on federalism concerns.
The only legislative history of section 2511(2)(d), Senator Hart's comments in the Senate Report
accompanying Title III and his statements on the Senate floor, is just as ambiguous as the other
legislative history of Title III. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,694-95 (1968). Although he never explicitly
mentioned the innocent recipient exception, Senator Hart emphasized that section 2511(2)(d) would
not prohibit private participant monitoring when a person recorded evidence of criminal activity
with the intention of taking the evidence to the police. Id. Senator Hart's comments, however, do
not directly address the question of what Tide III requires if the private participant monitor had
an unlawful purpose when taping, and therefore violated section 2511(2)(d), but later turned the
evidence over to the police.
Apart from the legislative history of sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515, the general legislative history
to Title III states that "the perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2156. Furthermore, at a congressional hearing discussing private participant
monitoring, one member of Congress stated that the sanction against unlawful private participant
monitoring should be limited to civil remedies and the exclusion of any evidence brought by the
procurer of the unlawful recording. 114 CoNo. Rec. 14,477 (1968). This general legislative history
indicates that Congress was particularly concerned about preventing unlawful procurers from using
the fruits of their acts. Unfortunately, the legislative history does not conclusively settle the innocent
recipient question.
331 United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d
319, 327 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 .U.S. 1000 (1976).
"2 See supra note 330.
333 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2184-85; see also Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81.
334 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2184-85.
333 Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
356 See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
337 Arguably, suppression would prevent the courts From becoming "partners to illegal conduct,"
which is sometimes considered a third purpose underlying section 2515. See Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41, 51 (1972).
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cently received the evidence, then suppression would not further the deterrent purpose
of section 2515. 338 The wrongdoer in these circumstances is a private person, not the
government. By penalizing the prosecution, a court would comply with the literal man-
date of section 2515, but would not deter anyone from violating Title III. Therefore,
because suppression would further only one purpose of section 2515, courts should
require a defendant to demonstrate a material privacy interest before suppressing the
evidence.
Applying Title III to protect personal privacy presents analytical problems because
privacy is a term that is susceptible of many interpretations.'" In addition, neither Title
III nor its legislative history provides a meaningful definition of privacy. Simply referring
to Title III's expressed concern for the protection of individual privacy does not resolve
the issue."' ,
The privacy that Congress intended sections 2511(2)(d) and 2515 to protect cannot
be the privacy that Katz protects pursuant to the fourth amendment."' Each willing
participant to a conversation takes the risk that another participant may record the
conversation and turn over the evidence to the police. 342 Thus, divulging that evidence
at trial does not violate the defendant's fourth amendment privacy right. 343
The privacy right that Congress intended sections 251I(2)(d) and 2515 to protect
must be a privacy concept other than what Katz protects. One noted commentator has
defined privacy as the right to control public disclosure of personal infortnation. 344
Disclosure at trial of the contents of a communication intercepted without a person's
consent undoubtedly intrudes on this concept of privacy. The right to control public
disclosure of personal information, however, is not absolute. Courts frequently have
subordinated this privacy right to the public's need to prosecute criminals. 945 Further-
more, Congress enacted Title III in part to provide law enforcement personnel with the
tools to obtain probative evidence to prosecute criminals more successfully.'" That the
police obtain the evidence inadvertently, rather than from their own authorized wiretap,
should not vitiate this stated purpose of combatting crime. In fact, section 2511(2)(c),
which authorizes participant monitoring by persons under color of law, demonstrates a
congressional intent to use evidence obtained by participant monitoring. Literal appli-
cation of Title III when the prosecution is the innocent recipient of the evidence, absent
the defendant demonstrating a privacy right in addition to his or her right to control
public disclosure of personal information, would not promote Title III's overall purposes.
In effect, a court in many instances would allow a criminal to go free because a private
335 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 480.
339 For example, "privacy" could refer to the fourth amendment reasonable expectation of
privacy as set forth in Katz. Or, privacy may refer to the privacy rights found in the penumbra of
the bill of rights by the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Alternatively,
privacy may mean the right to control the disclosure of personal information. A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 67-132 (1967).
340 See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974).
341 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-53 (1971). See generally Middleton, journalists
and Tape Recorders: Does Participant Monitoring Invade Privacy?, 2 Comm/ENT L.J. 287 (1979).
342
 White, 901 U.S. at 749-53.
34 , Id.
A. WESTIN, supra note 339, ch.2. See generally Comment, Investigations try Secret Agents, 45
WAsii. L. REV, 785, 790-94 (1970),
345 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.D.C. 1973).
346 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2177.
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citizen — the unlawful private monitor — has blundered."' To promote Title Ill's
overall purposes in innocent recipient cases, therefore, courts should require the defen-
dant to demonstrate a material privacy right — one distinct from and in addition to the
right to control disclosure of personal information. 348
Courts should consider several factors to determine whether disclosure would harm
a material privacy right of the defendant. The subject matter of the conversation should
be an important factors..' 9 For instance, conversations concerning criminal activity should
receive minimal privacy protection. 33° In United States v. Traficant, the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded that defendants do not have a
legitimate privacy interest in conversations concerning criminal activities.'" Conversa-
tions disclosing intimate or embarrassing details in a person's life, or trade or business
secrets, however, deserve more protections' ,"
The amount of material to be disclosed should also be a relevant factor."' Generally,
relatively small disclosures cause less harm than more extensive ones. Courts therefore
should also consider the quantity of evidence to be disclosed at trial in determining the
nature of the defendant's privacy interest.
A third factor for the courts to consider is the objective of the unlawful intercep-
tion.'" If the interceptor monitored the conversation for the purpose of harming the
defendant, then a serious privacy right of the defendant is at stake.'" If the interceptor
monitored for such other unlawful purposes as furthering a criminal conspiracy 336 or
harming a person other than the defendant, however, the defendant's privacy interest
diminishes."'
Admitting the evidence against the defendant, though contrary to Title Ill's lan-
guage, would not undermine its provisions. Successfully prosecuting the defendant will
further Title III's stated purpose of fighting crime. In addition, the defendant would
still have a civil claim for damages against the interceptor pursuant to section 2520.
Recovery through a civil claim will compensate the defendant for any injury caused by
the interception. Interceptors are also criminally liable for violating section 2511(2)(d).
The possibility of a civil suit and a criminal prosecution should deter interceptors from
"7 Cf. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (under the exclusionary
rule, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.").
345 See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979) (courts should construe statutes
in accord with the policy of the whole enactment).
549 See Benford v. ABC, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D. Md. 1980), aff 'd, 661 F.2d 917 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); see also Comment, supra note 58, at 507-08.
35° See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971); United States v. Traficant, 558 F.
Supp. 996, 1002 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (dictum).
"' Traficant, 558 F. Supp. at 1002.
""Y
	 Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 225.
"3 See id.
'54 See generally Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971).
"'See id.
355 The trial court found this type of unlawful purpose in United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp.
899, 908 (D. Mass. 1986).
3" Although Congress certainly may want to limit these other unlawful interceptions, and
provide for their prosecution, they do not invade the nonconsenting person's "privacy" any more
than does intercepting for a lawful purpose. Cf. People v. Hopkins, 93 Misc. 2d 501, 504-07, 402
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916-17 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (nonconsenting party has no standing to suppress tapes made
in violation of section 2511(2)(d) where the purpose of the interception was to harm a person other
than the nonconsenting party).
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violating Title III. Consequently, admitting the evidence against the defendant where
disclosure does not invade a material privacy interest, in combination with the possibility
of criminal and civil actions, would further Title Ill's overall purposes more than would
suppressing the evidence. 333
This note has discussed two different tests: a totality of the circumstances test for
determining what constitutes an "oral communication," and a "material privacy right"
test to determine when a court should allow an innocent recipient to use evidence
obtained unlawfully. The first test suggests factors to analyze a person's reasonable
expectations at the time of an interception, whereas the second test suggests factors to
analyze the extent of the privacy invasion caused by introducing evidence at trial. Courts
should construe the first test liberally. Persons should be able to avail themselves of Title
III's provisions. A narrow construction would frustrate Title Ill's purposes by preventing
both the government and private persons from using it. The second test, however,
should be construed more narrowly. Punishing the prosecution, and thus society, for a
private citizen's wrong is unjustified, especially in light of section 2511(2)(c), Title Ill's
exception for governmental participant monitoring, and the availability of other reme-
dies for the victim of the unlawful interception.
This note's framework attempts to strike the appropriate balance between Title Ill's
conflicting purposes. At times, the framework rejects a literal interpretation of the statute
when such an interpretation would not further Title III's purposes. By applying a
common framework, such as the one this note suggests, courts may be able to reach
decisions that are not only more consistent with each other, but also more consistent
with Title III's purposes.
B. Applying the Framework to United States v. Underhill and United States v. Vest
In United States v. Underhill, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the
defendants' motion to suppress tape recordings of telephone conversations made to
further their gambling operation.ss" The court held that those who intercept wire com-
munications, and their co-conspirators, waive any right to privacy that Title III was
intended to protect. The Underhill court agreed with the defendants that literal appli-
cation of Title III required suppression. 3" Nevertheless, the court of appeals ruled that
interceptors waive any right of privacy protected by Title 111.36 ' The court also held
that, because a co-conspirator is bound by the interceptors' acts in furthering the con-
spiracy, co-conspirators also waive any right to privacy in communication intercepted to
further their conspiracy. 362
Had the Underhill court applied this note's framework to the defendant-interceptors,
it would have reached the same result. 363 First, the intercepted telephone calls meet the
"" See Fishman, supra, note 143, at 76-77 (the proper course of action in the case of unlawful
private interceptions is to prosecute the interceptor, grant the nonconsenting party a civil cause of
action against the interceptor, and allow the government to use the evidence to prosecute the
nonconsenting party).
"9 813 F.2d at 112.
36° Id. at 111.
361 Id. at 112.
362 Id.
363 This framework's response to the problem posed by the interceptors seeking to suppress
derives from the Underhill court's analysis.
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statutory definition of a wire communication. 364
 In the next step of the framework, a
court examines the relationship among the defendant, the proponent of the evidence
and the intercepted communication. Because the Underhill defendants were also the
interceptors, they should not be permitted to use Title III's suppression provision to
shield themselves from the consequences of their own acts. 363 Suppression under these
circumstances would undermine, rather than further the purposes of Title 111. 3"
With respect to the defendant co-conspirator, applying this framework suggests the
same result as the Underhill court, although the analysis differs slightly from the court's.
As above, the intercepted telephone calls meet the statutory definition of a wire corn-
munication.367
 Furthermore, in this case, neither the defendant nor the proponent of
the evidence was the interceptor. Therefore, the court should suppress the evidence
only when disclosure at trial would harm a material privacy interest of the defendant.
Disclosure would harm no such interest in this case. The conversations concerned
gambling activities. 368
 Conversations about such criminal activities deserve little privacy
protection. In addition, the interceptors did not intend to harm the defendant.'" On
the contrary, the purpose of intercepting the telephone calls was to further the gambling
conspiracy of which all the Underhill defendants were a part. 370
 Therefore, after consid-
ering the factors that might comprise a legitimate privacy interest distinct from merely
controlling the public disclosure of personal information, a court should conclude that
the co-conspirator did not have a material privacy right that disclosure at trial would
harm."'
In United States v. Vest, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
prosecution could not use in its case-in-chief evidence from a tape recording made by
the defendant Vest's co-conspirator."' The trial court held that, because the defendant
intercepted the communication for the purpose of furthering a criminal conspiracy, the
interception violated section 2511(2)(d). 373
 The appeals court held, therefore, that section
2515 warranted suppressing the evidence. 374
 The court of appeals conceded that suppres-
sion would not further the deterrent aspect of section 2515. 373
 The court nevertheless
held that suppression was necessary to protect the defendant's privacy right. 376
Applying this note's framework to the facts in Vest would result in a different
decision. First, applying the totality of the circumstances test to the conversation between
334
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The statute's definition of a "wire communi-
cation" does not contain any express requirement that the person have a justifiable expectation that
his or her telephone call is not subject to interception. See id. § 2510(1). Had the definition contained
such an expectation, any interceptor would certainly fail to meet it because a person who intercepts
his or her own conversation does not have any such expectation.
367 See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
3" See id.
567 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3°8
 See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 107-08.
369 See id.
37° See id.
37 ' The Underhill court reached the same result using conspiracy principles from Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946). The Underhill court held that co-conspirators are bound
by interceptors' acts that furthered the conspiracy. 813 F.2d at 112.
372
 813 F.2d 477, 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1987).
3" 639 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Mass. 1986).
37"
	 813 F.2d at 481.
373 Id. at 480.
3" Id at 481.
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Vest and Waters suggests that the conversation did not meet the statutory definition of
an oral communication."' Even assuming that the conversation meets the statutory
definition, disclosure at trial would not harm any material privacy right of the defendant.
A court applying the totality of the circumstances test should conclude that Vest
could not justifiably expect that his conversation with Waters was free from interception.
The conversation between Vest and Waters occurred at Waters's office." 8 A co-conspir-
ator's office is not a place in which Vest reasonably should expect much privacy." In
addition, Vest and Waters were discussing their on-going conspiracy to "fix" Waters's
criminal trial."° They were not discussing intimate, noncriminal matters. Consequently,
the subject matter of their conversation should not receive much privacy protection.
Finally, Waters and Vest were not intimate friends. Vest, a police officer, and Waters, a
person under indictment for shooting another police officer, were co-conspirators." 81
Waters had given Vest $35,000 at this meeting. 382
 That Waters made a tape of their
conversation to ensure that Vest delivered the money to Tarantino is not at all surprising.
Therefore, the facts and circumstances surrounding Vest and Waters's conversation
suggest that any expectation Vest may have had that his conversation with Waters was
not subject to interception was unjustified. 888
Even if the conversation between Vest and Waters were to meet the statutory
definition of an oral communication, the Vest court should have denied the motion to
suppress. This was a case in which neither the defendant nor the proponent of the
evidence was the interceptor. Therefore, suppression is warranted only when disclosure
at trial would harm a material privacy right of Vest. After considering the factors that
indicate when disclosure would harm a legitimate privacy right — the subject of the
conversation, the amount to be disclosed, and the object of the interceptor's unlawful
purpose — a court should conclude that disclosure would not have harmed such a
privacy right in this case.
In the recording, Vest discussed ongoing criminal activity in which he was partici-
pating, not intimate or embarrassing personal facts, or trade or business secrets. 384 In
addition, although the decision does not address the issue of how much of the tape
would be disclosed, because this was a perjury prosecution, only a small disclosure was
likely. Finally, the Vest trial court found that Waters's purpose in taping was to further
the conspiracy. 585
 Waters's motive, according to the district court, was not to harm Vest. 586
Disclosure would not, therefore, have harmed a material privacy right of Vest's.
Underhill and Vest represent two federal circuit courts' most recent interpretations
of Title Ill's suppression provision in cases involving section 2511(2)(d) violations. Both
3" See supra notes 288-98 and accompanying text for the development of the totality of the
circumstances test.
778 813 F.2d at 479,
"3 See Alderman v, United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 n.11 (1969); see also Fishman, supra note
143, at 57 (a person's expectation of privacy is not reasonable when he or she is on a criminal
associate's premises and that criminal associate has consented to the interception).
36° Vest, 813 F.2d at 479.
331 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 479.
"2 Id.
282 See Benford v. ABC, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.2d 917 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981).
334 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 479.
333 Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Mass. 1986).
888 See id.
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courts looked beyond the statutory language in order, they claimed, to reach decisions
that would further Title III's stated objectives. The Underhill court correctly rejected an
unlawful interceptor's attempts to use Title III to shield himself from the consequences
of other illegal activities. Suppression under the circumstances in Underhill would not
have promoted any objective of Title III. In addition, the Vest court correctly rejected
the bright line innocent recipient exception. Neither the words of the statute nor its
legislative history warrant reading such a broad exception into Title III. Nevertheless,
suppression must further some stated purpose of Title III in order to be justified.
Suppression merely to comply with Title III's language, absent an identifiable privacy
interest of the nonconsenting participant, is not consistent with sound statutory inter-
pretation. Had the Vest court more closely examined the substance of the defendant's
privacy interest, it would have found that the defendant did not have a material privacy
interest at stake, and denied the motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The abuse of eavesdropping, wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance
is a pervasive problem in modern society. Congress enacted Title III to restrict the use
of electronic surveillance to those situations in which law enforcement officials comply
with strict procedures, and to certain types of participant monitoring. In particular,
section 25I 1(2)(d), the first federal law in this area, prohibits private participant moni-
toring with an unlawful purpose. Because Title III also has an express exclusionary .
provision, litigants frequently attempt to exclude evidence on the grounds that it derives
from an unlawful private participant monitoring.
In part because Congress did not draft section 2511(2)(d) to fit coherently within
the Title HI structure, courts have not yet developed a consistent framework to deal
with these problems. Although section 2511(2)(d)'s precise meaning is unclear, courts
should not resolve difficult issues involving private participant monitoring simply by
referring to Title III's expressed concern for protecting privacy. Only those persons
with a genuine privacy interest should be allowed to use Title III to suppress evidence.
In addition, courts should allow those who innocently obtain evidence derived from
violations of section 2511(2)(d) to use the evidence unless such use would harm a privacy
right of the nonconsenting party over and above the right to control the public disclosure
of personal information. By following these suggestions, courts will be able to construe
Title III in harmony with both its purposes: protecting privacy and combatting crime.
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